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FOREWORD
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey
was established by the Secretary of War on 3
November 1944, pursuant to a directive from the
late President Roosevelt. Its mission was to
conduct an impartial and expert study of the
effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be
used in connection with air attacks on Japan and
to establish a basis for evaluating the importance
and potentialities of air power as an instrument
of military strategy, for planning the future
development of the United States armed forces,
and for determining future economic policies
with respect to the national defense. A summary
report and some 200 supporting reports containing the findings of the Survey in Germany have
been published.
On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested
that the Survey conduct a similar study of the
effects of all types of air attack in the war against
Japan. The officers of the Survey in Japan, who
are all civilians were:
Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.
Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice
Chairmen.
Harry L. Bowman, J. K. Galbraith,
Rensis Likert, Franl{ A. MeN amee,
Fred Searls, Jr., Monroe E. Spaght,
Dr. Louis R. Thompson, Theodore P.
Wright, Directors.
Walter Wilds, Secretary.
The Survey's complement provided for 300
civilians, 350 off10ers, and 500 enlisted men. The
military segment of the organization was drawn
from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and
from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both

the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all possible assistance in furnishing nien, supplies, transport and information. The Survey operated from
headquarters established in Tokyo early in September 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya,
Osaka, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, and with mobile
teams operating in other parts of Japan, the
islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland.
It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime
Japanese military planning and execution engagement by engagement and campaign by campaign,
and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on
Japan's economy and war-production plant by
plant, and industry by industry. In addition,
studies were conducted on Japan's over-all strategic plans and the background of her entry into
the war, the internal discussions and negotiations
leading to her acceptance of unconditional surrender, the course of health and morale among
the civilian population, the effectiveness of the
Japanese civilian defense organization, and the
effects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports
will be issued covering each phase of the study.
The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japanese military, Government, and industrial officials. It also recovered and translated many
documents which have not only been useful to
the Survey, but will also furnish data valuable for
other studies. Arrangements have been made tv
turn over the Survey's files to the Central Intelligence Group, through which they will be available
for further examination and distribution.
The present report was prepared by the Chairman's Office rmder the editorship of Commander
Walter Wilds, USNR.
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JAPAN'S STRUGGLE TO END THE WAR

Preface

'

the course of events would not have been changed
materially had these persons been available for
interrogation.

While the impact of Allied air operations in the
entire Pacific war bore directly upon the enemy's
military and economic capabilities for resisting,
only by translating these military and economic
effects into political events could our announced
war aim of unconditional surrender be realized.
Japan's acceptance of defeat without invasion
while still possessed of 2}~ million combat-equipped
troops and 9,000 Kamikaze airplanes in the home
islands, reveal how persuasively the consequences
of our operations were translated into political
results. The nature of Japanese politics and its
vulnerability and responses to air assault constituted therefore a major and significant line of
inquiry for the Survey.
The "political target" comprised a ganglion of
Army, Navy, Government, and Imperial household factions which together decided major questions of national policy. Fortunately, most of
the pertinent questions relating to how Japan was
brought to acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration
find their answers in the simple chronology of
events which can now be narrated in some detail
for the period from the collapse of Tojo in July
1944, to the imperial rescript of 15 August 1945.
The evidence is .chiefly in the testimony obtained
by Survey interrogation of the Army, Navy,
Government, and Imperial household leaders who
participated or were influential in the struggle
within Japan over whether to continue the war or
to accept surrender. The inquiry might have
benefited from testimony of certain key figures
who were not available tv the Survey. Tojo,
Koiso, Togo, and a few others impounded for trial
as war criminals could not be interrogated. A
few, notably General Anami, the War Minister in
the Suzuki cabinet, had committed suicide. Since
the Emperor's participation in the crucial events
of the period preceding surrender had been revealed and corroborated by other participants, an
interview with Hirohito would not have been
productive. It is felt that the general picture of

I. Some Properties of the Political Target
To assess the events of surrender requires a
capsule reminder of the interrelated pressures,
the interlocking mechanism of Japanese politics.
The starting point is that Japan was governed
largely by a consensus among the oligarchy of ruling
factions at the top. No major decisions of
national policy could be reached until such a
consensus had been obtained. This process inevitably took time and involved complicated
pressures and struggles of will among those of
differing opinions.
A flow-chart of the chief pressures would show
the Lord Privy Seal (Marquis Koichi Kido
throughout the war period) as the Emperor's
political agent, an observer and estimator of the
current GovernmenVs problems and its capabilities for coping with them. To one side, clear of
responsibility or authority, but in this instance
with pipe lines into the Government which informed them of the true state of affairs, were the
senior statesmen or Jushin. These ex-premiers
could not enforce their views, but did apply
persuasive and informed pressure on the Privy
Seal and other Government leaders. The Jushin
also had interlocking membership with the
Privy Council which approved important decisions
in foreign policy, and individual Jushin were
frequently close to the Emperor. Then there
was the Cabinet, which once formed could perpetuate itself so long as it was strong and successful.
An important test of its strength and success
was its ability to absorb or modify the views and
policies of the Army and Navy, who named their
own Cabinet ministers, whose ministers and chiefs
of staff had direct access to the Emperor, and who
were influenced until the end by the fanaticism
of the majority of Army officers and younger
Navy officers. One important wartime innova1

tion to this flow-chart, the Supreme War Direction Council or Inner Cabinet, will be explained
in a later section dealing with Koiso's time.
This political mechanism had several special
characteristics which were peculiar to our eyes and
important to these events: (l) the Lord Privy
Seal was the custodian of the Emperor's political
powers and chief protector of the "national
polity" or Tenno system; (2) the Japanese had a
fine penchant for diffusing political responsibility;
(3) politicians and ardent militarists, as did the
Japanese people themselves, viewed the Emperor
and sacred homeland through an emotional and
reverent haze; (4) the system of Government
afforded enormous areas wherein personal j udgments and estimates of a small group determined
ultimate policy; (5) opinions and attitudes of the
general public had significance only as a single and
subsidiary factor in the considerations of the
leaders.

useful to restate briefly the basis on which Ja.pan
began the war in December, 1941. Japan entered the war securely in the hands of the radical
military clique that originally rose to power in
Manchuria and was led and symbolized by Tojo.
This group had already achieved a police state
and the controlling position in Japanese policy
during its uneasy coalition with the conservatives
in the two preceding Konoye governments. It is
noteworthy that the clique took Japan to war
without concrete minimum or maximum objectives nor any clear conception as to how the
war could be brought to a close. The decision to
attack was roughly calculated as a two-way
gamble. If the European Axis defeated Soviet
Russia, Japan would require chips to play on the
winning side at the peace settlement with the
United States and Britain that might well follow.
On the other side, and independent of European
events, a quick drive to the Southern Resources
Area accompanied by a series of stunning and
crippling defeats of the United States forces
would redre~s Japan's relative strength and create
a situation in which the United States might be
willing to negotiate a peace by trading out the
issues on terms favorable to Japan. Great confidence was put in the eventual superiority of
Japan's fighting spirit over the potential material
superiority of the United St"'>i>es. This calculation, whatever its other shurtcomings, obviously
contained at least two serious misreadings regarding the United States, first, in failing to
appreciate the tenacious and passionate finality
with which America would prosecute the war, and
second, in underestimating the military importance
of the enormously greater economic potential
with which the United States would create and
bring to bear a technically superior force.
The risks involved were understood and asserted
by some leaders in the debates which preceded
Pearl Harbor. Their original concern gave them
a basis for recognizing as early as spring, 1944,
that Japan was facing ultimate defeat. By that
time United States determination to fight and
her ability to mount successful thrusts in the
Pacific even before opening the second European
front, had already been demonstrated for all who
knew the true situation to see. The political
problem of those who saw the situation was to
discover and circulate among other leaders in
retirement or outside the government a true picture of the war, and then to unseat the Tojo government in favor of one which would bring the

II. Behind the Collapse of Tojo
In the period betwePn the Pearl Harbor attack
and June 1944, Japan's defeats at Midway, in the
Solomons, New Guinea, and the Marshalls,
coupled with the crippling effects of her shipping
losses, produced political consequences which were
appa.rent in frequent cabinet shuffles, Tojo's increase of personal authority through the multiple
Cabinet jobs he assumed, and tightened controls
intensifying the Government's efforts to program
military output for a protracted war. The first
definitive break in the political coalition which
began the war occurred following our success at
Saipan. Ti\n days thereafter, on 18 July 1944,
the cabinet headed by Gen. Hideki Tojo fell, after
being continuously in office since 20 October 1941.
This marked a significant turn in the course of
Japan's wartime politics, the importance of
which in retrospect is difficult to overstress. It
was not merely the result of an immediate crisis.
Even at that. early date, there were symptoms
that opposing elements had finally found means
of applying pressure against the fanatic exponents
in Japan's militarist clique. It revealed in clear
trace the effective, though still undercover, intervention of factions which had either opposed
war before Pearl Harbor, or gone along, or "retired" in the first phases of the conflict.
To explain the dilemmas and activities of those
leaders who felt in the spring of 1944 that Japan
was facing certain defeat or at least that the time
had come for positive steps to end the war, it is
2

war to an end. Prime illustrations of such moves
at this time were the operations of Takagi and
Sakomizu.
Rear Adm. Soichi Takagi, who was attached to
the ministerial secretariat of the Naval General
Staff, made a study between 20 September 1943
and February 1944, of the war's battle lessons up
to that time. He concluded that Japan could not
win and verbally presented his findings in March
1944 to Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai and Vice Adm.
Seibi Inouye.
Takagi's study, interestingly
enough, was undertaken at the end of the second
year of the war- the time beyond which, the
Japan ese Navy's top command had estimated
before hostilities, Japan could not fight a successful
war. Takagi's estimate was based on an analysis
of fleet, air, and merchant ship losses suffered to
date, the serious difficulties in acquiring essential
imported materials, the internal confusion in
Japan, and a growing feeling among the "intelligentsia" that Tojo should be let out. It seemed
clear to Takagi that potential long-range air attacks on the home islands and Japan's inability
to import essential materials for production had
created a situation which dictated that Japan
should seek a compromise peace. In Takagi's
view Japan at this time should have envisaged
withdrawing from China and giving up both
Korea and Formosa as part of the peace terms.
His study in any case documented the fears
Yonai and others h eld before the war and lent
support to the increasing but still carefully guarded
concern of their fellow Jushin that all was not well
with Tojo's prosecution of the war.
Hisatsune Sakomizu is another early example of
a connecting link between the unpleasant facts of
the war and the senior statesmen outside the
Government. As a member of the Cabinet Planning Board in 1943- 44, he had given information
as to the unfavorable war situation to his fatherin-law, Admiral Keisuka Okada, who retailed it
to Kido among others. Okada also had word sent
to Tojo that it would be best for him to resign.
All this was not only educational as to ,Japan's
true condition, but indirectly helped to build up
political pressure for the fall of Tojo. Among
important examples of the wa.v this pressure
worked were: (1) Tojo had to reconstruct his
cabinet just before the Marianas campaign (Saipan
was invaded on 15 June 1944), when Shinsuka
Kishi, the Commerce and Agriculture Minister,
and Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister,
threatened to withdraw; (2) Y onai, supported by
710381-4.&--2
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.the Jushin, refused Tojo's request that he join the
cabinet as minister-without-portfolio; and (3) the
resignation of Shigetaro Shimada, the Navy
Minister, which helped to force out Tojo 3 days
afterward, had been actively assisted by the
senior statesmen.
These steps give the pattern of the behind-scenes
talks and illustrate the combined efforts of (1)
those who already knew that Japan, facing defeat,
should save itself by accepting Allied terms,
(2) those who believed Japan should take active
steps to end the war, hoping to achieve terms
better than unconditional surrender, and (3) those
who realized Japan's situation was desperate, but
thought improved resistance could be achieved
only by dropping Tojo.

III. The Koiso Government
The loss of Saipan, followed by Tojo's collapse,
marked a major turning point of the war and
brought forth the Cabinet of Kuniaki Koiso, a
retired Army general who was known as a Tojo
critic. This government was a disappointment to
the more zealous peacemakers and conceivably an
inept choice of that ever-cautious political litmus
paper, Marquis Kido. Nevertheless, Koiso's government broke the grip of the Tojo clique as the
ruling faction, took important and necessary steps
toward peace, and may even have been an unavoidable step in the transition from Tojo to the
surrender Cabinet of Admiral Suzuki.
When designated to succeed Tojo, Kosio received an Imperial admonition to give .Japan's
situation a "fundamental reconsideration" looking
to the termination of the war. If this murky injunction was intended to seek peace, it early became clear that the new government as a whole by
no means understood its mission since the "reconsideration" resulted in a decision to continue the
war with renewed vigor and further sacrifice.
At this time, in the late summer of 1944, intensive air assault on the home islands had not yet
begun. But output of a number of essential
items had already passed the peak, shipping
losses had reduced imports of essential materials
below the needs of the existing industrial plant
capacity. Japan faced a declining output of such
war necessities as aircraft, oil, transport, steel, and
coal. Although public confidence in the war remained high, morale of the leaders and "intelligentsia" was falling, principally as knowledge of
previous defeats and difficulties became more
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generally spread to the further discredit of the
military factions.
Among the first moves of the new Koiso government was the creation of the Supreme War Direction Council. On 5 August 1944, 3 weeks after
the fall of Tojo, this new Inner Cabinet was
formed. Announced purpose of the Council was
"to formulate a fundamental policy for directing
the war and to adjust the harmonization of the
combined strategy for politics and war". It comprised six regular members-the Premier, Foreign
Minister, Army Minister, Navy :Minister, Army
Chief of Staff, and Navy Chief of Staff- who
could, however, bring in any other Cabinet minister as a regular member when necessary. In
addition, the two deputy chiefs of staff attended
meetings but did not vote, and the Council had
a secretariat. The group was formed originally
as a liaison between the military and the Cabinet,
but its composition and dominant role made it in
practice an inner war cabinet concerned with the
highest policies and plans such as measures to
maintain fighting strength, central economic decisions, whether to continue the war, etc. The
agenda originated within the Council itself. Its
decisions had to be ratified by the full cabinet
before becoming final. It also had direct access
to the Emperor and the Emperor could himself
initiate meetings with the Council. The Council,
lilce the Cabinet, did not work on majority votes,
but on general agreement or "unity". Important
issues on which unity was lacking were presented
to the Emperor usually in the form of alternatives
for his choice. To one acquainted with the Japanese talent for divided authority and controls,
piecemeal responsibility and decisions, and considering the past failures to cope administratively
with the necessities of total war, the Council may
be taken as an outstanding accomplishment.
Nor is it possible to exaggerate the central
importance of this committee, for certainly from
early May of 1945 until the August surrender the
enemy's principal problem was to give expression
to its political decision to end the war. During
that period the military and economic and morale
effects of our operations were significant chiefly as
they bore directly upon the top political decision
already made and the struggle between those
political leaders who had already determined to
find a way out of the war and the militarists who
were determined to continue it. Cumulative
difficulties and defeats bred further determination

among the peace seekers who increasingly opposed
the intransigency of the militarists.
The Council accordingly was on one hand a
symbol and test of how far Japan's original warmaking coalition had been discredited and liquidated, and on the other hand a successful reintegration of the ruling factions which could act with
authority and purpose in solving their dilemma.
The magnitude of this last point can be shown by
citing the following considerations. First, the
two chiefs of staff (and their deputies) who
formerly had been not merely responsible for
executing operational plans but also almost autocratically capable of formulating them, were now
drawn into discussions of over-all national policy,
matters of economic capability, the political
realities, etc.; the military were finally harnessed
and joined to political, economic, and civilian
requirements. Second, the Council afforded a
few key ministers who were determined on peace
a more effective and enhanced basis for achieving
it through domination of a small group, working
in the greatest secrecy, with direct and official
access to the Emperor.
Early in September 1944, Yonai, who had become Vice Premier and Navy Minister under
Koiso, directed Takagi to resume his secret studies
of steps to get out of the war. Working with
Yonai and the Navy Vice Minister, Vice Adm.
Seibi Inouye, Takagi considered such questions as
(1) how to get Army agreement to end the war;
(2) issues involved in possible Allied terms such as
demands on Japan after the war, reparations,
protection of the "national polity"; (3) the problem of public opinion and morale in the event of
peace; (4) how to reach the Emperor and work
through him to accomplish their purpose. As
these studies progressed, private briefing sessions
were held with Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Kido,
Marquis Tsuneo Matsudaira, the Imperial Household Minister, Okada, and a number of others.
Sometime later Admiral Koshiro Oikawa, the
chief of naval staff, and Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa,
the deputy chief of naval staff, were informed of
these maneuvers. Contacts were also established
with Army people. Takagi testified that quite
a number of them were convinced and some, in
fact, brought pressure upon the Army minister.
This served, however, only to stiffen the Army's
attitude against all peace moves and many on
the Army side recanted for reasons of discipline
and personal safety.
In these conversations some differences of opin-
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but what is significant here is that at least by
March 1945, a specific peace overture was under
cabinet discussion.
In this desperate situation, and since important
eleme.n ts both within the government and among
the leaders outside were favoring and initiating
peace moves, it is legitimate to ask why the Koiso
cabinet did not end the war in the fall of 1944.
Members of Japan's original war-making coalition,
though no longer in full control, still had great
strength within the top Army command, the
middle ranks of both services, and the bureaucracy
of the Government. They constituted a distinct
threat of revolt or a coup in the estimate of the
civilian and Imperial household leaders. Certain
general and psychological factors also determined
the further conduct of the war and the central
decision by the Koiso regime: (1) It is clear that
the Japanese leaders entered the war deeply convinced that they were fighting for their very
national existence and life, whereas the United
States they believed was merely pressing for economic advantages and a set of principles, but not
for vital security. (2) Japan had no specific plan
other than negotiation for ending the war she
began. A predilection for negotiation- demonstrated in terminating the Russo-Japanese war,
efforts to enlist the United States in bringing the
China Incident to a close, etc.- maintai'1ed a hope
that Japan could trade it out with the Allies.
(3) The Casablanca statement and the Cairo
Declaration setting forth Allied terms for unconditional surrender were still considered by Japan's
leaders to be just declarations, not actual final
terms to be imposed. (4) The desire to save face,
to preserve the Tenno system, and fear of the
military and the police at this period helped the
factions favoring continued resistance. (5) The
information policy of minimizing United States
successes and capabilities, while distorting their
own losses and exaggerating their ability to conduct effective operations, had left the people
ignorant of the fact of Japan's actual military
situation at this time. Some Government factions
feared internal chaos, "communistic revolts and
disorganization" if the true situation became
lmown.
Thus so nicely balanced were the ruling factions
and cliques that their interrelation conditioned
the expression of policy as w~ll as its formation,
and accounts in part at least for the unusual timelapse between the top civilian political decision to
accept defeat and the final capitulation. The

ion emerged as to peace terms-some favored
giving up all occupied territories, whereas others
thought Formosa and Korea were required for
food. It was generally agreed that the only way
to reach the public was through the Emperor, if
conformity to a peace decision were to be secured
and a possible military coup avoided. Okada
approached Kido frequently on this subject.
Takagi reported that Konoye had already made
up his mind along similar lines before these talks
began. Takagi further stated that as a result of
these activities they were prepared to carry
through toward peace in the face of Army opposition, if need be even to the point of withstanding
an Army revolt.
Although the peacemakers were well represented
in the Koiso government, the cabinet's decision
was taken to continue and renew the war effort
hoping for an improved position from which to
seek a compromise peace. The validity of the
peacemakers' estimates was demonstrated by
further attrition of air forces and shipping, a
declining basic industrial production and a seriously lowered civilian livelihood. In the meantime, the initial air raids on the Empire coupled
with loss of the Philippines had a deepening effect
upon these attitudes. The leaders especially
feared the threat to production, the decline in
public morale, and a break-up of Japan as Germany even then was breaking up.
By December 1944 private conversations among
the top ruling factions, including Kido, Konoye,
Yonai, Okawa, Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, etc.,
were addressed to problems created by urgent
need for peace. The Emperor on his own initiative in February 1945 had a series of interviews
with the senior statesmen whose consensus was
that Japan faced certain defeat and should seek
peace at once.
Discussed at least, during March 1945, was the
plan to initiate peace steps through the mediation
of China. Prince N aruhiko Higashikuni was
the chief ad vocate of this scheme, and it received
some consideration and support among the Jushin
and at the foreign office. Choice of China as
Allied negotiator was based in part on the ingen. uous notion that since "she was a neighbor and
fellow member of the co-prosperity sphere", her
mediation would be more suitable than direct
approaches to the United States. Terms were
to be based on Japan returning to her pre-1931
boundaries. There is no clear evidence available
to the Survey as to how far the plan was carried,
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result in the Koiso cabinet at least was a temporary stalemate.
The Okinawa landings on 1 April were quickly
followed by Koiso's fall on 8 April and the designation of Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki as
Premier.

of 1-10 June 1945.") Suzuki, who agreed with
the estimate, presented it to the Emperor.. Concurrently he asked ex-Premier Koki Hirota to
sound out th(' Russian ambassador to Tokyo,
Y akov A. Malik, privately as to the Russian
attitude toward interceding with America.
Early in May (prior to the 18th according to
a statement of Navy Chief of Staff, Admiral Soemu
Toyoda) the Supreme War Direction Council
began to discuss ways and means of ending the
war. Concurrently other meetings of the Council
were goiug on with the view of obtaining Russia's
services at an opportune time. Foreign Minister
. Togo was leader of this. While Hirota was
.talking with Malik, Ambassador Sato had been
instructed in Moscow to prepare th~ way for
a Japanese emissary to discuss improvement of
Soviet-Japanese relations and Russia's intercession
to end the war. Specific terms for ending the war
apparently did not come up at this time, but the
Council was prepared that whatever the result
they "would be worse than prewar conditions".
The Potsdam Declaration had not been issued, but
it was felt that the Cairo Declaration terms would
not actually be applied; it was looked upon as
a declaration only, whose terms could be reduced
by negotiating and by being in a position to exact
"hea.vy sacrifices" if the war continued.
Thus during the forepart of May two separate
but interrelated topics were before the Inner
Cabinet, one dealing with Japan's inability to
continue the war, the other initiating talks with
Russia for intercession. Shortly after the end
of the European war, 8 May, the War Minister,
General Korechika Anami, asked the Cabinet
for an Imperial conference to decide the "fundamental principle of the war," that is whether to
continue it. This action, while not indicating
that the army was ready to quit (on the contrary
the war minister and army chief of staff urged
continuance of hostilities), did confirm Kido's
belief that the Army would permit open consideration of the question within the Cabinet only
after Germany's collapse. Perhaps even more
important it was an affirmative test of the wisdom
in selecting Anami as War Minister. For even
though he held out to the last against unconditional surrender (Anami committed suicide on 15
August), at no time did he obstruct the positive
peace steps which were being taken by Suzuki
and the others, although by resigning he might
have forced the Suzuki government out of office.
This negative support of the peace moves by

IV. The Suzuki Cabinet
Kido's estimate affords the best guide to the
political situation which produced the Suzuki
government. The Lord Privy Seal stated to the
Survey that Japan's situation called for a man who
could think fundamentally, had deep convictions
and great personal courage. Although many
among the peacemakers had long favored · a
stronger man than Koiso, Kido at least was convinced that so long as Germany remained in the
war Japan would be in danger of a military coup
in the event firm and positive steps were taken
immediately to end the war. In any case the
hopes for positive steps under Koiso's aegis were
not fulfilled, primarily becnuse he was not strong
enough to stand up to the military. When Suzuki
was named Premier, Kido stated the question
was not whether to end the war, but by what
means and how quickly.
Suzuki informed the Survey that when he
assumed office "it was the Emperor's desire to
make every effort to bring the war to a conclusion
as quickly as possible, and that was my purpose".
This created a position Suzuki described as difficult. On the one hand he had instructions from
the Emperor to arrange an end to the war; on the
other hand any of those opposing this policy who
learned of such peace moves would be apt to attack
or even assassinate him. Thus with the general
staffs, Government in general, and the people, he
advocated increased war effort and determination
to fight, whereas "through diplomacy and any
other means available" he had to negotiate with
other countries to stop the war.
Almost immediately, Suzuki ordered his chief
cabinet secretary, Sakomizu, to make a study of
Japan's fighting capabilities and whether they
were sufficient to continue the war. Sakomizu
concluded in May that Japan could not continue
the war, basing his estimate on Japanese studies
as to the inability to produce aircraft, losses and
damage to shipping, the precarious food situation
and the antiwar sentiments . of the people. (A
copy of this estimate came into Survey hands
from Yonai in November 1945, and is appended
in translation as "Survey of National Resources as
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his real feelings. On 20 June the Emperor on
his own initiative called the six council members
to a conference and stated that it was necessary
to have a plan to close the war at once, as well as
a plan to defend the home islands. He asked
what the council thought of that idea. The
Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the
Navy Minister stated that they fully concurred
with the Imperial view and that such steps were
then being taken to that end. Then the Emperor
in turn asked when the ministers expected they
would be able to send a special ambassador to
Moscow. The reply was that it was uncertain
but they hoped he could be sent before the Potsdam conference. Sakomizu testified that after
this expression from the Emperor, Suzuki decided
he could stop the war; when he returned from
the conference he told Sakomizu "Today the
Emperor said what everyone has wanted to say
but yet was afraid to say."
After that the Government redoubled its talks
with Russia and decided to send Prince Konoye
to Moscow if he were persona grata. On <10 July
the Emperor called Foreign Minister Shigenori
Togo and said, "As it is now early July should not
our special ambassador be dispatched to Moscow
without delay?" Since Soviet Ambassador Malik
was ill in Tokyo and the conversations the1·e were
not progressing, Sato was again instructed to put
the matter directly to the Vice Commissar for
Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Russia asked for
more details concerning the mis~ion and Sato
was directed to explain the mission as follows:
(1) to make an improvement in relations between
Russia and Japan (in view of Russia's denunciation of the neutrality pact), and (2) to ask Russia
to intercede with the United States in order to
stop the war. The Soviets replied on 13 July that
since Stalin and Molotov were just leaving for
Potsdam no answer could be given until their
return to Moscow. On 12 July meanwhile the
Emperor had called in Konoye and secretly instructed him to accept any terms he could get and
to wire these terms direct to the Emperor.
Konoye also testified that when Sa to was sounding
out the Russians he reported the Russians would
not consider a peace role unless the terms were
unconditional surrender, and that this reply had a
great influence on the Emperor.
In the days before the Potsdam Declaration,
Suzuki, Togo, andY onai became pessimistic about
the Russian negotiations. They expected eventually that they would have some answer; but

certain Army leaders would have afforded an
interesting line of inquiry had Anami et al been
available to the Survey for questioning. The
N a.vy of course was divided, with Yonai among
the foremost advocates of peace and Admiral
Soemu Toyoda, the Navy Chief of Staff, siding
with the Army. But Toyoda also was restrained
in his opposition to Cabinet peace councils; he
testified:
Only two persons in all of the Navy ·h ad any knowledge of the discussions relating to intervention of Russia,
the Navy Minister and the Chief of the Navy General
Staff. It may be (Toyoda continued) that since frequent
conferences were being held some of the others high up
in the Navy Ministry might have had some suspicions.
and because I felt that such might be the case I stated
to my deputy chief of staff that although conversations
were being carried out relative to the conclusion of the
war, that was not an affair with which officers should be
concerned * * * I believe that a similar situation
prevailed in the Army , that only two officials had definite
knowledge of these discussions.

From June until the close of the war, the nan·ative of political events in Japan is clear and rather
detailed from the testimony of Y onai, Toyoda,
Suzuki, Umezu, and Sakomizu, corroborated by
Kido, Konoye, Hiranuma, and others. After
Anami's request for an Imperial conference
Sakomizu prepared a statement for that occasion
which opened by saying that the war should be
"accomplished", and the Emperor's reign and the
homeland kept intact. This was followed by the
details of Sakomizu's estimate prepared shortly
after Suzuki assumed office. On 6 June the six
regular members of the Council discussed what
steps should be taken to prosecute the war. Also
at the meeting were the chief cabinet secretary,
the chief of the Navy's military affairs bureau, the
chief of the Army bureau of military affairs, the
head of the Cabinet Research Bureau and the
1v1inister of Agriculture and Commerce. The
conclusion was that w1less some radical measure
could be adopted to arouse the people, theN ation's
war power was bound to decline very rapidly. At
this session, as Toyoda explained,
No one expressed the view that we should ask for
peace- when a large number of people are present it
is difficult for any one member to say that we should so
entreat.

On 8 June the six regular members of the Council conferred with the Emperor. The statement
was read by the Emperor who made no comment at
this meeting. Each of the others expressed his
own official opinion, but none as yet expressed
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if it were unfavorable they concluded that their
only recourse would be to broadcast directly to the
United States.
On 26 July the Potsdam Declaration was issued.
In their deliberations on that statement, which
began immediately, no member of the Inner Cabinet had any objections to ending the war. Suzuki,
Togo, and Yonai felt that the declaration must
be accepted as the final terms of peace at once,
whether they liked it or not. The War Minister
and the two chiefs of staff on the other hand felt
that the terms were "too dishonorable". Discussion centered around first the future position of
the Emperor, second the disposition of war criminals, ap.d third the future form of Japan's "national polity".
On 6 August in the midst of these discussions
an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.
Early reports to Tokyo described very great
damage, but the military did not think it was an
atomic bomb until President Truman's announcement and a mission of Japanese scientists sent to
Hiroshima confirmed it. On the morning of 7
August Suzuki and Togo conferred and then reported the news to the Emperor, stating that this
was the time to accept the Potsdam Declaration.
The military side still however could not make up
their minds to accept it.
These differences continued to be examined and
hope of favorable word from Russia had been all
but abandoned when very early in the morning of
9 August the news arrived that Russia had declared war. Although considerable pessimism had
prevailed regarding the outcome of the negotiations, the Government ·was not prepared for war
with the Soviets, nor the military capable of any
effective counter-plan. Suzuki calculated that he
had a choice of resigning or taking immediate
positive action, which could be either declaring
war on Russia and continuing until the whole
Nation was destroyed or accepting the Potsdam
Declaration. He conferred with the Emperor
around 0700 and after a couple of hours decided to
accept the Potsdam terms, with which decision
the Emperor agreed. A meeting of the six regular
members of the Supreme War Direction Council
was called for 1000. After two gloomy hours it
remained deadlocked as before on the 1. wo opposing
opinions: (1) To accept the Potsdam Declaration
outright, with the understanding that it did not
alter the Emperor's legal position; (2) to accept
the declaration with the following conditions:
(a) that the Allied forces would not occupy the

homeland; (b) that the Japanese military and
naval forces abroad would be withdrawn, disarmed and demobilized by Japan itself; (c) that
all war crimes should be prosecuted by the Japanese Government.
Suzuki, Yonai, and Togo favored the first
opinion, whereas Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda
supported the second. When this three-to-three
split could not be resolved, the full Cabinet was
called in, and after an explanation by Togo, nine
voted for unconditional acceptance, three voted
for the conditional acceptance and three others
favored intermediate positions. After a session
lasting until 2000 without achieving unity, the
cabinet declared au intermission. In this impasse
Suzuki decided to request ·an Imperial conference
for the Inner Cabinet at which the conflicting
views could be presented and the Emperor's own
decision sought. At 2330 on the 9th the conference
was held, with chief cabinet secretary Sakomizu
and Hiranuma, the Privy Council president, also
attending. The Potsdam Declaration was first
read to the Emperor, then Togo expressed his
opinion, followed by all of the others who stated
their views. Around 0300 on the lOth Suzuki
announced (as paraphrased by Sakomizu's testimony):
We have discussed this question for a long time and
everyone has expressed his own opinion sincerely without
any conclusion being reached. The situation is urgent,
so any delay in coming to a decision should not be tolerated.
I am therefore proposing to ask the Emperor his own wish
and to decide the conference's conclusion on that basis.
His wish should settle the issue, and the Government
should follow it.

The Emperor then stated his own view (again
paraphrased by Sakomizu),
I agree with the first opinion as expressed by the foreign
minister. I think I should tell the reasons why I have
decided so. Thinking about the world situation and the
internal Japanese situation, to continue the war means
nothing but the destruction of the whole nation. My
ancestors and I have always wished to put forward the
Nation's welfare and international world peace as our
prime concern. To continue the war now means that
cruelty and bloodshed will still continue in the world and
that the Japanese Nation will suffer severe damage. So,
to stop the war on this occasion is the only way to save
the Nation from destruction and to restore peace in the
world. Looking back at what our military headquarters
have done, it is apparent that their· performance has fallen
far short of ·the plans expressed. I don't think this
discrepancy can be corrected in the future. But when I
think about my obedient soldiers abroad and of those who
died or were wounded in battle, about those who have lost
their property or lives by bombing in the homeland, when
I think of all those sacrifices, I cannot help but feel sad.
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munications between the two countries. The
next morning, about 0800 the 14th, Suzuki decided
to go to the Emperor privately and ask him to
call an Imperial conference, which the Emperor
could do at any time, but the Government could
not without the consent of the two chiefs of staff.
The terminal conference was held before the
Emperor at 1000. Present were the 16 Cabinet
ministers, the two chiefs of staff, Hiranuma
representing the Privy Council, the chiefs of the
bureaus of military and naval affairs, and the chief
cabinet secretary, Sakomizu. Suzuki announced
that the Emperor had called the meeting to consider the American reply in his presence, so that
everyone who had an opinion should express it
freely. Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda stated that
the American reply was insufficient, that they
favored asking again for a more concrete answer,
or if that were impossible the war should be continued. All the others favored acceptance. Then
the Emperor, as quoted by Sakomizu, said:

I decided that this war should be stopped, however, in
spite of this sentiment and for more important considerations.

Suzuki then said,
The Imperial decision has been expressed.
be the conclusion of the conference.

This should

Immediately thereafter the full Cabinet resumed
its meeting and ratified unanimously a decision to
accept the Potsdam terms provided they did not
alter the Emperor's · prerogatives. This was
cabled to the United States through the Swiss
around 0700 the lOth. The United States reply
was received from the San Francisco broadcast
about 0400 on the 12th and officially about 0700
the 13th. The broadcast reply was immediately
studied by the Inner Cabinet and the official
documents put before the full Cabinet meeting
around 1300 on the 13th. Acceptance was
favored by 13 ministers, but 3 were opposed.
Early in the evening the Cabinet recessed.
Toyoda, the Navy Chief of Staff, stated the
objections as follows:

"It seems to me that there is no other opinion to sup•
port your side (the military's). I shall explain mine. I
hope all of you will agree with my opinion. My opinion
is the same as the one I expressed the other night. The
American answer seems to me acceptable."

On the question of the Emperor's position, the American
reply made no direct statement but did state that the
powers of the Emperor and the Japanese Government
would be subject to the authority of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The main point . . . had
to do with the Emperor's position since it was the conviction of the Japanese people that the Emperor was a living
god above whom there could be no earthly being. It was
feared that the Japanese people would not readily accept
the wording of the reply which placed the Emperor in a
subordinate position . . . So the suggestion was made to
query the Allied Governments as to whether it would not
be possible to have the orders and instruction of the
Supreme Commander go directly to the Japanese Government and those orders passed on by the cabinet to the
Emperor who . . . would carry out the work connected
with the termination of the war.

He then asked the Government to draft an
Imperial rescript to stop the war, and offered to
broadcast the decision to the people. The Cabinet
returned to their office and formally accepted unconditional surrender.

V. The Political Target Under Assault
From the foregoing calendar it remains first to
outline the nature of the political target presented
by Japan and second to assess various factors
which contributed to the success of the assault on
the enemy's will to resist.
A. To those who thought of Japanese resistance
ftS typified by a fanatical Japanese soldier who
fought until rooted out of his last-ditch foxhole,
the possibility of forcing a surrender appeared to
be remote. Our aim in the Pacific war was,
nevertheless, to induce responsible Japanese leaders
to admit defeat. Compelling such an admission
at the earliest moment constituted the objective
of our attack.
In total war Lhe nature of the political target is
linked to the political structure and the spirit of
the enemy. In the case of Japan that spirit
differed as between the general populace and the
top ruling elements. This separation of public
from leaders was an important consideration.

It is not clear whether this objection arose from
a sincere endeavor to preserve the Tenno system
through a typically Japan ese concern with semantics, or a last-ditch effort to void the decision for
peace, or fear of a military coup if the Emperor's
position were not m eticulously preserved. In any
case, it is significant that the two chiefs of staff
refused that evening to sign the document, with
the Premier, which was required for the Governm ent to request a conference with the Emperor.
The two chiefs of staff stayed up all night with
the Foreign Minister, pressing him to ask the
American Government for a more "exact" answer.
The Foreign Minister refused, insisting that it
would be construed as a refusal of the terms
offered and thus disrupt the slim string of com-
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Japan had long been conditioned to oligarchic
rule. Rigid police controls allowed the ideas and
spirit of the leaders to form separately from those
. of the people. Popular morale therefore became
just another factor in the reckonings of the ruling
group. At the war's opening and throughout its
early stages, the spirit of both leaders and people
was chauvinistic, aggressive, expansionist. After
the defeats at Midway, Port Moresby, and
Guadalcanal, Japan went on the stratE-gic defensive. Though her advance had been stemmed,
she had won an empire and needed only to con5olidate her conquest. Thereafter, under the
pressure of our counter-offensive which eventually
exposed her home islands to direct attack, seriously
reduced her fleet and air forces, and blockaded her
already inadequate economy, the early hope of
victory was replaced by fear of defeat. Finally,
a desperate determination to resist remained.
Japan's will to resist, the core target of our
assault, was supported mainly by military potential, pro-d uction potential, morale of the people,
and such political considerations of the leadership
as the preservation of the Tenno system, etc. So
long as these factors supported resistance they
operated, of course, as impediments to surrender.
Thus affecting the determination of Japan's
leaders to continue the war was not alone the
actual loss of an air force capable of defending the
home islands, but the loss of hope that this air
force could be replaced, let alone enlarged. It
was not necessary for us to bum every city, to
destroy every factory, to shoot down every airplane or sink every ship, and starve the people.
It was enough to demonstrate that we were
capable of doing all this-that we had the power
and the intention of continuing to the end. In
this fashion, those responsible for the decision to
surrender felt the twin-impact of our attack which
made them not only impotent to resist, but also
destroyed any hope of future resistance.
The will of the political leaders to resist collapsed
well before the will of the people as a whole. The
leaders were, however, unwilling to move too far in
advance of public opinion. At the time of surrender, even though there was little pressure
toward surrender from the people, their confidence in victory had been thoroughly undermined
and they accepted the Imperial rescript, perhaps
with surprise, but not with active resistance as
some of the leaders had feared.
One further point should be developed and
stressed here. The political objective which

existed in Japan lay exposed and vulnerable to
air attack, which fact goes far toward ,explaining
the true basis for unconditional surrender without
invasion of the home islands. That vulnerability
to air attack derived in part from the basic character of the war in its decisive phases. It turned
out to be essentially a war to win air control .over
the Japanese homeland. This concept was not
merely central to much of the strategy guiding
our operations, but was thoroughly understood
and feared by an effective sector of Japanese
leaders who sought and achieved political power
to terminate the war. By the summer and fall
of 1944, and throughout the remainder of the war,
the validity of their fear was being persuasively
demonstrated by the application of our air power
in its several roles. Loss of fleet and air forces,
without which, as the leaders knew, no effective
defense could be mounted, was almost entirely
the result of our air superiority. Vital perimeter
bases were lost when our air forces neutralized
them, sealed off both the air and sea reinforcement, and gave direct local support to our occupying operations. Japan's limited war production,
already starved for materials through shipping
lost to our submarines, was further depleted by
air interdiction of sea communications as new bases
eventually permitted almost complete blockade
day and night. Heavy bomber and carrier raids
against cities, military and industrial installations, further depleted her remaining resources,
productivity and transport, lowered morale, and
brought the true war situation home to the Japanese people. Thus the Japanese leaders lost
both power and hope of resistance as our air
weapons exploited air control over the home
islands.
B. By relating them to the narrative set forth
in the first sections of this report, it is possible to
treat separately the principal contributions to
surrender made by various factors which bore on
the terminal events of the war.
1. Blockade of Japan's r;;ea communications exploited the basic vulnerability of an island enemy
which, with inherently second-power resources,
was struggling to enlarge its capabilities by milking the raw materials of a rich conquered area.
Acute dependence upon imports of such basic
items as oil, iron ore, coal, bauxite, food, etc.,
caused Japan's shipping position even in the fall
of 1941 to appear deficient to several members of
the Jushin, whose opinions were declared to Tojo
before the Pearl Harbor attack. These fears were
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well-founded, at least for long-term fighting, since
Japan began the war with 6,000,000 tons of merchant shipping, which were barely sufficient for
estimated minimum requirements. Her capacity
to build was quickly exceeded by losses. Eightyeight percent of Japan's total merchant shipping
available during the war was sunk. United States
submarines sank 55 percent of the total lost. Our
Navy and Army air forces made important contributions by sinking 40 percent of Japan's total
shipping lost, by interdiction of sea routes, and
by an aerial mining program carried out by B-29s
in the last months of the war which sealed off the
vital Inland Sea and disrupted every major home
island port. The blockade prevented exploitation
of conquered resources, kept Japan's economy off
balance, created shortages of materials which in
turn limited war production, and deprived her of
oil in amounts sufficient to immobilize fleet and
air units and to impair training. These effects
were intimately associated with the political conditions culminatiug in the fall of Tojo and Koiso.
The direct military and economic limitations imposed by shortages created virtually insoluble
political as well as economic problems in attempting to achieve war production adsquate for the
defense of Japan. The special feeling of vulnerability to blockade, to which a dependent island
people are ever subject, increased and dramatized,
especially to the leaders, the hopelessness of their
position and favored the growing conviction that
the defeat was inevitable.
2; While the blockade was definitive in strangling Japan's war mobilization and production, it
cannot be considered separately from the pressure
of our concurrent military operations, with which
it formed a shears that scissored Japan's military
potential into an ineffectual remnant. In the
early engagements that stemmed the Japanese
advance and in the subsequent battle for bases,
the application of our air power against vital forces
which Japan committed piecemeal in defense of
these perimeter positions enabled us largely to
destroy her navy and reduce her air forces to
impotence before the home islands could be
brought under direct air attack. Throughout
these operations we were employing air power
effectively and potently in ways the Japanese
leaders understood and feared, and had no adequate defense to withstand. Although a core of
bitter-end resistance lay in Japan's army and navy
until the Imperial rescript was signed, it should be
noted that Tojo's collapse and the introduction of
710381--46----3

peace-making factions into the succeeding Koiso
government quickly followed the loss of Saipan in
July 1944. Also, after the costly and vitiating
defeats in the Palaus, Philippines, and at lwo Jima,
Koiso was in turn succeeded shortly after our
Okinawa landings of 1 April 1945 by the Suzuki
cabinet, which was formed with the specific mandate to terminate the war. In these campaigns,
dictated by our need for air mastery and won by
immediate air control, while Japan's loss of effective naval and land-based air forces was overwhelming, her military attrition was not complete,
since our operations used up by no means all of
her ground and Kamikaze forces. Japan's prineipal land armies were in fact never defeated, a
consideration which also supported the military's
continued last-ditch resistance to the surrender
decision. It nevertheless appears that after the
loss of the Marianas in July- August 1944, the
military commands, though unconvinced of final
victory, viewed defense against our subsequent
operations as affording an opportunity for only a
limited success, a tactical victory which might, so
they hoped, have created a purchase from which
to try for a negotiated peace under terms more
favorable than unconditional surrender.
3. Fear of home island bombing was persuasive
to the political leaders even before its direct effects
could be felt. News of the B-29 and its intended
capabilities reached Japan in 1943. B- 29 raids
on Kyushu and southern Honshu targets began
from China bases on 15 June 1944. With the loss
of Saipan in early July 1944, many leaders became
wholly convinced of Japan's eventual defeat, one
factor being that from Marianas bases the homeland would be brought under the kind of intensive,
shattering a.ir assault even then being administered
to their German partner. The timing of the ·
strategic bombing attack affected its role in the
surrender decision. After the :M arianas were lost
but before the first attacks were flown in N ovember 1944, Tojo had been unseated and peacemakers introduced into the Government as prominent
elements. The war economy had already passed
its peak, fleet 11nd air forces had been critically
weakened, confidence of the "intelligentsia" in the
Government and the military had been deflated,
and confidence of the people in eventual victory
was weakening. By mid-1944 shortages of food
and civilian supplies were reflected in reduced living standards. Therefore the actual physical
destruction wrought by strategic bombing assumed the role of an accelerator, to assist and
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expedite forces already in motion. It added a
tremendous quantitative weight to those forces.
Since the means of resisting direct air attacks had
already been largely destroyed, it represented the
full exploitation of air control by an air weapon.
These attacks became definitive in the surrender
decision because they broadened the realization
of defeat by bringing it home to the people and
dramatized to the whole nation what the small
peace party already knew. They proved day in
and day out, and night after night, that the United
States did control the air and could exploit it.
They lowered morale by demonstrating the disadvantages of total war directly, added a vital
increment of both actual and clearly foreseeable
future production loss by both precision and area
attacks, and applied pressure on the surrender
decision by eliminating the hope of successful final
resistance.
4. When Japan was defeated without invasion,
a recurrent question arose as to what effect the
threat of a home-island invasion had had upon
the surrender decision. It was contended that
the th:t·eat of invasion, if not the actual operation,
was a requirem0nt to induce acceptance of the
surrender terms. On this tangled issue the evidence and hindsight me clear. The fact is, of
course, that Japan did surrender without invasion,
and with its principal armies intact. Testimony
before the Survey shows that the expected "violation of the sacred homeland" raised few fears
which expedited the decision to surrender beforehand. Government and Imperial household leaders felt some concern for the "destruction of the
Japanese people", but the people were already
being shattered by direct air attacks. Anticipated
landings were even viewed by the military with
hope that they would afford a means of inflicting
casualties sufficiently high to improve their
chances of a negotiated peace. Preparation
of defenses against landings diverted certain
resources from dispersal and cushioning moves
which might have partially mitigated our air
blows. But in Japan's then depleted state, the
diversion was not significant. The responsible
leaders in power read correctly the true situation
and embraced surrender well before invasion was
expected.
5. So long as Germany remained in the war that
fact contributed to the core of Japanese resistance.
Slight evidence exists that some hope was held
for a long-promised German miracle weapon. A
telegram received on 6 May in the German em-

hassy at Tokyo revealed that Hitler was dead, the
promised new weapon had failed to materialize and
that Germany would surrender within a matter of
hours. Kido believed, presumably on Japanese
Army representations, that the Army would not
countenance peace moves so long as Germany
continued to ' fight. It is not clear whether this
was a face-saving position, designed to avoid a
prior Japanese surrender. In any case on 9 May
1945, immediately after the Nazi capitulation,
Gen~ral Anami, the War Minister, asked the Cabinet for an Imperial conference to reconsider the
war situation. The significant fact, however, is
that Japan was pursuing peace before the Nazis
collapsed, and the impoverishment and fragmentation of the German people had already afforded
a portent of similar consequences fox an intransigent Japan.
,
6. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs
did not defeat Japan, nor by the testimony of the
enemy leaders who ended the war did they persuade Japan to accept unconditional surrender.
The Emperor, the Lord Privy Seal, the Prime
Minister, the Foreign M:inister, and the Navy
Minister had decided as early as May of 1945 that
the war should be ended even if it meant acceptance of defeat on allied terms. The War Minister
and the two chiefs of staff opposed unconditional
surrender. The impact of the Hiroshima attack
was to bring further urgency and lubrication to
the machinery of achieving peace, primarily by
contributing to a situation which permitted the
Prime Minister to bring the Emperor overtly and
directly into a position where his decision for
immediate acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration
could be used to override the remaining objectors.
Thus, although the atomic bombs changed no
votes of the Supreme War Direction Council
concerning the Potsdam terms, they did foreshorten the war and expedite the peace.
Events and testimony wh_ich support these
conclusions are blue-printed from the chronology
established in the first sections of this report:
(a) The mission of the Suzuki government,
appointed 7 April 1945, was to make peace. An
appearance of negotiating for terms less onerous
than unconditional surrender was maintained in
order to contain the military and bureaucratic
elements still determined on a final Bushido
defense, and perhaps even more importantly to
obtain freedom to create peace with a minimum
of personal danger and in.ternal obstruction. It
seems clear however that in extremis the peace-
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makers would have peace, and peace on any
terms. This was the gist of advice given to
Hirohito by the Jushin in February, the declared
conclusion of Kido in April, the underlying reason
for Koiso's fall in April, the specific injunction
of the Emperor to Suzuki on becoming premier
which was known to all members of his cabinet.
· (b) A series of conferences of the Supreme War
Direction Council before Hirohito on the subject
of continuing or terminating the war began on 8
June and continued through 14 August. At the
8 Jun e meeting the war situation was reviewed.
On 20 Juno the Emperor, supported by the
Premier, Foreign Minister, and Navy Minister,
declared for peace; tho Army Minister and tho
two chiefs of staff did not concm. On 10 July
the Emperor again mged haste in the moves to
m ediate through Russia, but Potsdam intervened.
While the Government still awaited a Russian
answer, the Hiroshima bomb was dropped on
6 August.
(c) Consideration of tho Potsdam terms within
the Supreme War Direction Council revealed the
same three-to-three cleavage which first appeared
at the Imperial conference on 20 June. On the
morning of 9 August Premier Suzuki and Hirohito
decided at once to accept tho Potsdam terms;
meetings and moves thereafter wore designed to
legalize tho decision and prepare tho Imperial
rescript. At the conclusive Imperial conference,
on the night of 9- 10 August, tho Supreme War
Direction Council still split three-to-throe. It was
necessary for the Emperor finally to repeat his
desire for acceptance of tho Potsdam terms.
(d) Indubitably the Hiroshima bomb and the
rumor derived from interrogation of an American
prisoner (B- 29 pilot) who stated that an atom
bomb attack on Tokyo was scheduled for 12
August introduced urgency in the minds of the
Government and magnified the pressure behind
its moves to end the war.
7. The sequence of events just recited also
defines the effect of Russia's entry into the Pacific
war on 8 August 1945. Coming 2 days after the
Hiroshima bomb, the move neither defeated

Japan nor materially hastened the acceptance of
surrender nor changed the votes of the Supreme
War Direction Council. Negotiation for Russia
to intercede began the forepart of May 1945 in
both Tokyo and Moscow. Konoye, the intended
emissary to the Soviets, stated to the Survey that
while ostensibly he was to negotiate, he received
direct and secret instructions from the Emperor
to secure peace at any price, notwithstanding
its severity. Sakomizu, the chief cabinet secretary,
alleged that while awaiting the Russian answer on
mediation, Suzuki and Togo decided that were
it negative direct overtures would be made to the
United States. Efforts toward peace through the
Russians, forestalled by the imminent departure of
Stalin and Molotov for Potsdam, were answered
by the Red Army's advance into Manchuria.
The Kwantung army, already weakened by diversion of its units and logistics to bolster island
defenses in the South and written off for the defense of Japan proper, faced inescapable defeat.
There is little point in attempting more precisely
to impute Japan's unconditional surrender to any
one of the numerous causes which jointly and
cumulatively were responsible for Japan's disaster. Concerning the absoluteness of her defeat
there can be no doubt. The time lapse between
military impotence and political acceptance of the
inevitable might have been shorter had the
political structure of Japan permitted a more rapid
and decisive determination of national policies.
It seems clear, however, that air supremacy and
its later exploitation over Japan proper was the
major factor which determined the timing of
Japan's surrender and obviated any need for
invasion.
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts
and supported by the testimony of the surviving
Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's
opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945,
and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945,
Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic
bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had
not entered the war, and even if no invasion had
been planned or contemplated.
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APPENDIX A-JAPANESE DOCUMENTS
Table 1

APPENDIX A-1. ESTIMATE OF JAPANESE
NATIONAL STRENGTH AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE GREATER EAST ASIA
WAR AS OF DECEMBER 1941

[TN: Quantities given in kiloliters]

Source of supply

A. General

First year __ ____________ __
Second year ______________
Third year _____________ __

In a greatly changing world situation, the
policy adopted by the Japanese Empire is to
attain a position of self-sufficiency based upon
national strength which it can maintain independently.
In determining the over-all policy of war or
peace, it is always necessary to make a proper
estimate of the Nation's strength.
However, because of extreme difficulty in obtaining complete data and because of the many
complicated and unpredictable factors in the
changing material resources situation, an estimate
of the actual stTength of the Empire is not a simple
matter. Thus, it is a dangerous practice to
translate national strength into mathematical
terms and use them without hesitation as the
criteria in deciding on war or peace.

Domestic
output

Synthetic
oil

Oil output
of occupied!
territories

200, 000
200,000
400, 000

300,000
700,000
1, 500,000

300,000
2,440,000
2, 770,000

I

Total

800, 000
3, 340,000
6, 670,000

3. Shipping capacity.- The total transport capacity for the fiscal year 1941 was 53,000,000 tons.
At the outbreak of war, Japan will have ships
totalling 6,100,000 tons at her disposal. The
total estimated transport capacity for the fiscal
year 1942 is approximately 85 percent of the 1941
total or 45,000,000 tons.
Table 2.

Anticipated Damage and Replacement of
Ships
[TN: Quantities given in tons]
First year of war

Anticipated damage_ -1800, D00-1, 100, 000
Replacement__ _______
300,000

B. Scarce Items Preventing Complete Selj-srifficiency
1. Rice.
2. Fuel.
3. Essential war materials.
4. Transport capacity.

Second year of
war

Third year of
war

I 700, OQ0-800,
000 I 700,000- 800,000
500,000
600,000

Estimated (shipping) situation after the third
year of war:
Total tonnage on hand ____ __ _________ 5, 250,000
Tonnage required by the Army and
Navy_ _ _ __ __ _ __ _ __ _ 2, 400, 000
Tonnage required for civilian
use ________________ 2,850, 000

C. Examination of Principal Resources

4. Iron.- Annual requirements if military preparations progress at the present rate and current
production capacity is expanded:

1. Rice.- Supplies of rice must be obtained
from French Indochina and Thailand, and these
supplies can be had if transport space is made
available.
2. Fuel estimates: oil:-(a) Amount stored as of 1 October 1941:
9,050,000 kiloliters.
(b) Estimated consumption: 5,500,000 kiloliters
per year after the outbreak of war.
Navy, 2,500,000 kiloliters.
Army, 600,000 kiloliters.
Civilian requirements, 2,400,000 kiloliters.
(c) Estimated supply.

Tons

Military requirements ____ __ _____ ____ _
Production expansion ________ ____ ____
Civilian requirements ___ _______ _____ _
Miscellaneous ___ ____ ____ ___ __ _____ __

2,
1,
1,
1,

200,000
600,000
500,000
200,000

Total __ ___ _____ ___ ______ _____ 6, 500,000

The iron ore for the above requirement could
be supplied from Japan, Manchuria, China (including Hainan Island) and French Indochina.
5. Nickel.- The shortage is great and there are
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VI

Unit of quantity

Total requirements

12,300
4, 000
450
480,000
9,000
800
65,000
1, 500,000
100,000

T in.------------------- . . . .. do ............

___ . . do .. ····-··· -..... do ............
_____ do ............
..... do ............

A ntimony ore ..........
M ercury ___ -----------B auxite ................
Asbestos .• _---·-·-····-

M lea ....... _._. ___ ... __ ....• do ...•....... _
c rude rubber __ ........ ....• do ........... _

ndustrial salt._ ...... _. ..... do ............

R Ice••...........•...... 1,000 koku s____ . __

t
I
I

Pl\renthesized 100,000 not explained,
First digit blurred.
Ore.
• Reclaimed ,

80,000

zinc.... _. __ . ___ .. ______ ..... do .... ____ ....

94,000

150,000

0

200

!55
50.000
2, 500

200

2,000

70,000

28,000

80,000

200,000
170,000

40,000

100,000

L ead ... ---------------- ..... do .......... __

0

N ickel ore .............. ..... do ............ 'I, 250,000

c-obalt ore.............. ..... do ............
c opper..... ----······-- ..... do.-----------

300

5, 500

8,200
2,000

T ungsten ore ...•......• ..... do .... ······-M olybdenum ore....... ..... do .•..........

200,000

300,000

M anganese ore ....... .. ..... do ............

China

French
Inrlochina

Potential supply

Thailand
Total

Stock
pile-reclaimed
Dutch
Indies

Philippines

British
possesslons

Prospective supply

0

400,000

50
0

2, 300

60
0
0

0

3,000

I, 200

0

0

0

0
400

0

0

800,000

0

500

200
0
0
400

0

0

0

0

0

0

700
0

0

300,000 2, 700, 000

40
5
0
200

(500)

300

600

0

0

0

0

500
0

0

70,000
(100, 000)

0
40,000
(80, 000)
80.000
• (250, 000)
4. 000

I

500
160
50.000
57,000

10, 500

79,000

29,200

80.000

60.000
[Sic]
40,000

7,000
700

200,000

100,000

----------

7

100
0

70, 000
• 60,000
32,000
• 3,000
8,000
'3,000
3, 000
• 500
1, 0011
300
330.000
• 71,000

30,000

60,000

1,000
500

250,000

0

150,000

12
(400, 000)

5,000
(10, 000)
0
0
350,000
0

0

0

0

0

200,000

50
0

27.000

I

I

0

0

0
(1,000)

0
0
0
0

0

80,000

0

300,000

0

0

0
0

30,000

I

I

I

I

Figures in parentheses represent production.
Secure Chinese output.
Limit use.

Although shipping Is lacking in wartime, 4,000,000 metric tons of steel
can be supplied.
Increase production and economize in
consumption.
Amount from China can be increased .
Domestic production and amount
from Manchuria can be increased.
Economize in nickel consumption;
secure Celebes source of supply.
Control food \Sic. Possibly typographical error ; limit use.
Limit use; reclaim; secure Philippine
source of supply .
Limit use; Increase domestic and
Manchurian production .

Remarks

0

tfi

Increase domestic and Manchurian
prorluction; limit use.
0
(400, 000) Figures in parentheses represent production.
0

500
(1, 500)
50
0
100,000
0

100,000

2, 500

0

10,000

0

I, 300
0

32,000

0 2, 000,000 I, 400,000

• May he 7,000. Figures blurrcrl.
• Seconrl digit nnt clear. Possibly 220,000.
7 Possibly 110.000.
a 1 koku~4.96 bushels.

665
0
25,000
65,000
(40, 000)
70.000 I, 500,000
(250, 000)
2,000 1,000, 000

8, 200
(15, 000)
0
0
0
100

0

0

0

0

0

0

300

0

0 7, 002,000 3, 000,000
[Sic]

---- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---- - - - - - - - - - - -

Domestic Manchuproducria
tion

ron ore ________________ Metric tons ....... 10,000,000 3, 950,000

Material

Supply

Table 3.-AnnuaJ Requirements and Supply of Essential Materials

no measures for obtaining supplies myhin our
present sphere of influence. It must be obtained
from occupied territories in the south.
6. Crude rubber.-On the basis of an economic
agreement, the amount expected from Thailand
and French Indochina is 45,000 tons. Domestic
requirements are 65,000 tons and the amount on
hand is less than 500 tons. Unless the amount
procured from French Indochina and Thailand is
increased, or a supply of over 20,000 tons is secured
from the Netherlands East Indies, the shortage will
have a great effect upon domestic industry andespecially upon the progress of military preparations.
7. Tin.-- Unless a supply of about 10,000 tons
annually is procured from Thailand and French
Indochina, not only would it be impossible to
meet national requirements, but even peacetime
military preparations would come to a standstill.
After 2 years of war, present stock piles would be
completely depleted.
8. Ooppe1 .-Supplies on hand will soon be cut
in half if the present trend continues. Thus, it
will be necessary to develop sources in the Philippines for supplies of copper.
9. Lead.- If the present situation continues, the
supply will be halved. If more lead can be obtained from Burma, the supply will be sufficient.
10. Oobalt.- Cobalt must be procured from the
Netherlands East Indies.

at this time to make careful preparations to cope
with public reactions in case the Okinawa campaign results in .a disaster and to provide proper
indoctrination against such an eventuality. Moreover, it is to be expected that in the future the
enemy's psychological warfare will intensify.

C. Manpower
1. As compared with material resources, there
is a relative surplus of manpower, but there is no
efficient exploitation of it. Although distribution
and mobilization of manpower do not respond to
shifting of production, there is still room for increasing war potential depending on its efficient
application. On the other hand, the case of military mobilization does not permit optimism.
2. The physical standard and birth rate of the
people are on the down grade.
NOTES:

(a) Surplus manpower:
Industry _________ 2,000,000
Commerce________ 500, 000
Others ___________ 500,000

Ther e is a reserve of 3,000,000. At present, effort is
being made to apply this surplus to agriculture and transportation where shortages exist.
(b) M obtli zati on and distribution of man po.w er.- Workers
available for various industries in December 1944 (between
the ages of 16 to 60):
Male _________ ____ 20,300,000.
Female ___________ 24,000,000.
TotaL ___________ 44, 300, 000 (37, 500, 000 already engaged in industries
and armed forces).

APPENDIX A-2. SURVEY OF NATIONAL
RESOURCES AS OF 1-10 JUNE 1945

(c) Rate of population increase per 1,000.-After 1940,
there is a yearly increase of approximately 1,000,000:

A. General

1940, 12.7; 1941, 15.2; 1942, 14.2; 1943, 13.8 ; 1944,
figures unknown; it is estimated that since birth
rate decreased and infant mortality increased,
the figure is lower than that of the previous year.

The ominous turn of the war, coupled with the
increasing tempo of air raids is bringing about
great disruption of land and sea communications
and essential war production. The food situation
has worsened. It has become increasingly difficult to meet the requirements of total war. Moreover, it has become necessary to pay careful attention to the trend8 in public sentiment.

D. Transportation and Communications
1. Transportation and shipping.-The volume of
available shipping space was sharply reduced and
at present comes to a total of 1,000,000 tons.
Transportation is faced with insurmountable
difficulties because of fuel shortages, mounting
fury of enemy attacks on our lines of communications, and insufficient manpower in cargo
handling.
The question of whether or not we can maintain
communication with the continent will greatly
depend upon the results of the Okinawa campaign.
If the campaign turns to our disadvantage, we
cannot hope to maintain planned communication
after June. For the same reason, the cargo-

B. National Trends in General
lVIorale is high, but there is dissatisfaction with
the present regime. Criticisms of the government
and the military are increasing. The people are
losing confidence in their leaders, and the gloomy
omen of deterioration of public morale is present.
The spirit of public sacrifice is lagging and among
leading intellectuals there are some who advocate
peace negotiations as a way out. It is necessary
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i.

carrying capacity of vessels will
decrease.

drastically

2. Ooal.- Accompanying the increasing severity
of air raids and reduction in transport capacity
and production, there is a strong possibility that
a considerable portion of the various industrial
areas will have to suspend operation for lack of
·
coal.
3. Industrial salts.- Shipping from the continent has decreased and production of chemicals,
which is dependent on soda, is falling off at an
alarming rate. After the middle of this year, we
will be confronted with a shortage of basic salts.
For this reason , not only will there be difficulty
in producing light metals and synthetic oil, but
also in producing explosives.

NOTES

Shipping
Gross tons

December 194L _________________________ __
December 1942 ___ __ ______________________ _
December 1943______ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ __ _ _ _ __ _ __
July 1944 ____ ______________ ------- ----- --April 1945 __ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ __ __ _ __ _ __

5, 500, ooo·
4, 600,000
3, 700, 000
3, 100,000
1, 250, 000

Actual losses
Percent

Previous average ______________________ _________ 7- 10
This year____ __ _ __ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ __ __ __ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ __
23

2. Transportation and railways .- Transport
capacity of the railways will drop to half that of
the previous year due to the intensified enemy air
attack and our inability to maintain construction
and repairs on an efficient level. It is feared that
railway transportation will become confined to
local areas, especially after the middle of this year.
Shuttle transports (trucks, wagons, etc.) and
cargo handling have become the bottleneck of
land and sea transportation, because of the
scarcity of fuel and labor.

NOTE S

In the first quarter of 1945, the objective was to obtain
46,000 tons, but the actual result was approximately 40
percent.
Aluminum producti on
Ton•
1941 _____ _________ ____ __________ __ ____ ____ _ 73,000
1942 _________________ _____________________ _ 110, coo
1943 ___________________________ , ---------- 140,0CO
1944 _____ __ _______________________________ _ 110,000
1945 ___ __________ __________ ------------ - -- 1 9, 000

N OTE.S

I

Projected for firs t

qu art~ r.

Railway transport capacity
'l'ons

4. Liquid fuel.- Hereafter Japan, Manchuria,
and China will have to depend upon their own
sources for fuel oil. With oil reserves on the
verge of exhaustion and the delay in plans for
increased output of oil, we are faced with an
extreme shortage of aviation fuel. This, of course,
will have a serious effect on the planning of future
operations, especially after the mid-year.

1941_ ______ __ _____ ________________ _____ 150,000,000
1942- -- --- ------ ------- - ---------- - ---- 160, 000, 000
1943_- ------ -- - ----------------------- - 180, 000, 000
1944 ____ __ ___ ___ __ _______ __________ ____
1945 - _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ ___ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ I 90, 000, 000
19~

1

00~000

Projected.

3. Communications.- Maintenance of communication will be exceedingly difficult after the
middle of this year, because of enemy air-raid
damage and shortages of materials and personnel.

NOTE S

[U ni t: 1,000 kl.]

E. Material Resources
1. Steel.- Shipping of iron ore has become
difficult. The total production is about one-fourth
that of the same period of the previous year.
Construction of steel ships cannot be expected
after the mid year. Even a shift to the use of
existing materials would mean overcoming numerous obstacles before the plan could be executed.

Storage

P roduct ion
Year

Various
t y pes of 1 Crude oil I
fuel processed

1941..
....... 1
1942
_________
1943 _________
1944 .. ...... .
1945 .........

3,
3, 470
020
3. 460
2, 0.53
1,362

I

1, 570
1, 2fi6
1, 969
734
330

P eriod

Various
types of 1 Crude oil
fuel processed

I Apri1194L.
_______ I
April1942 ___ ____ __
April 1943 .........
April1944 .........
April1945....... ..

4,
4, 4571
115
2, 940
1, 822
752

3, 562
1, 963
1, 220
558
779

NoTEs

Steel production

5. Modern weapons with aircraft as a nucleus.It is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain
production of aircraft due to the ever increasing
tempo of air raids, the destruction of transportation systems and production facilities, and the
lack of raw materials and fuels.

Tons

194 L _ _ _ _ __ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ __ __ __ _ _ _ __ 4, 200, 000
1942 ____________ __ ___________________ ____ ~ 10~ 000
1943 - - - - - - - - - - - _·- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4, 200, 000
1944 ___ __________ ___ _____________________ ~ 70~000
1945_ ----------- - --- ---- - ---------------1

1

270, 000

Projected for first quarter.
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APPENDIX A-3. COMPARISON OF MILITARY STRENGTH OF JAPAN AND THE
UNITED STATES AT THE OUTBREAK
OF HOSTILITIES

PToduction of aircraft
1944, monthly production __ ____ " _ __ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ 2, 230
1945, ApriL _____ __ ___ ____________________ __ __ 1, 800
1945, May ________ _______ ___________ ___ c _ _ _ _ _ _ 1, 600

(Compiled from memory by innividuals concerned at that
time)

F. National Living Conditions
1. Foodstuffs.- The food situation has grown

A. Main Strength of the Imperial Navy in
December 1941

worse and a crisis will be reached at the end of
this year. The people will have to get along on an
absolute minimum of rice and salt required for
subsistence considering the severity of air raids,
difficulties in transportation, and the appearance
of starvation conditions in the isolated sections of
the nation. It is apparent that the food situation
will become further aggravated this year.
2. Living conditions.- From now on prices will
rise sharply bringing on inflation which will
seriously undermine the wartime economy.

1. Surface strength:

Battleships_ _ _ ________ ____________
Aircraft carriers _ ____ ______________
Heavy cruisers:
First class_ _ __________________
Second class_ _ _ _ __________ ____
Light cruisers _ ______ ______________
Destroyers __ _______ _______ __ _______
Submarines_ ______________________
Seaplane tenders__ ____ _____________
Submarine tenders_ ________ ____ ____

8
10
16
110
64
1 5
3

2. Air strength:
Fighter planes ___ ________________ __
Carrier-based born hers__ _ __________
Carrier-based attack planes_ _____ ___
Land-attack planes _____________ ___
Reconnaissance seaplanes____ _______
Flying boats____ _____ _______ _____ _

500
180
300
350
340
15

NoTEs
Anticipated supply and demand of rice for 1945 (estimate
made 1- 10 June)
[TN: 1 koku=4.96 bushels]

Koku

(a) Estimated supply, Japan proper_ _______ 77, 165, 000
(b) Estimated demand _____ ____ ___________ 84,258,000
(c) Estimated imports from Manchuria and
ICorea ______________________ _________ 4, 250,000
(It will become increasingly difficult to realize this figure
depending upon air raids.)
Deficiencies will be alleviated with military rice and by
placing restrictions on rice distribution.

10
9

1 Including 2 converted seaplane tenders.

B. Japanese Navy Estimates of Allied Naval Strength at Beginning of the War
Table I.-Estimate of Disposition of Main Surface Forces
Bnti; h

United States

Hawaii areal Philippines! We;t_coast,
area
Umted
States

- -- - - - - -.1

I

I

.Atlantic
area

.Aleutian

area

I

I

Indian
OC<'an area
Stren~th
(Including
available
Malay area East and Au,trruian
area
for transfer
Southeast
to Far Ea.' t
Afrira)

I

I

·I

I

Dutch

1---1---

Battleships ___ _____ ________ ___ __
8
.Air1•raft carriers .. ____________ __
3
Com-et ted aircraft carriers ______ -----------Heavy cruisers___ __ ___ _________
12
Light cruisers__ ______ __ __ ______
5
Small cruiser$___________ _______
2
f\ostroyers __ ______ ______ _______
• 30
Submarines__ ____________ ______
(')
Othe<". __ ------------ ---------(')
Sub tender·-·---- ____ ______ _
Seaplane tend~r _______ ____ _
Others __ ----- ------- ______ _
I

Pin.• 4 (!) .

'No reserve strength available for some time.

• Approximately.

• Several.

Non~

1. Total United States strength:
Battleships __ __ ------------------- ---- ---------------------- --Aircraft carriers __ ------------------------ --- ------------------Converted aircraft carriers.- ------------------------ --------- -Henvy cruisers:
First cla.<;s ___ --------------- ----- ---- -- - --------- ------ ----Second class __ _------------------------- ------------------Light cruisers. ___ ______ ______ ______________________________ ____
Destroyers __________________________________________ ------_____
Submarines (excusive of coastal subs)_________________________

2. Estimated .Additions During War:
(a) United States:
Year ending Dec. 1942-1 battleship, 2 aircraft carriers.
Year ending Dee. 1943-4 battleships. 2 airrraft carriers.
(b) Enl!land: No increase of strength in Fnr Ea.qt until war situntion
in Enroll<' improrcs.
(c) One cruiser, 1 destroyer, and several subm!U"ines moved to England
from Holland and under construction may be added to strength
in Far East by mid-1942.

13
6
2
18
9
10
250
35
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Table 2.-Estimates of Disposition of Allied Air Strength
[TN: All figures are approximate]
United States

Hawaii
area

Wake- !Philippines
Midway
area

British

Aleutian
area

I

Strength
available
for transfer
to Far
East

Malay
area

Burma
area

1----1

Fighter planes _____________ ____ _
Large planes (4 engines) _______ _
Medium planes (2 engines) ___ _
Small attack planes __________ _
Reconnaissance and observation planes __________________ _
Reconnaissance seaplanes _____ _
Flying boats ___

India
area

Dutch
Australia

1----1---

80
'JO

!Wake
•Midway
NOTES
2. Estimates of potential United States aircraft p1·ouuctiou:
Estimated planes on hand, December 1941:
Army------- ----- - ------ - -- -- ----- --- ------- --- ------ - ---_ 40, QOO
2, 600
Navy----- -- -- --- -- --.--- --- -- -- -------- -- -------·- --- -- -- 30,000
7, 100
TotaL _- ------------------------------------------- _____ 70,000
16, 200
Estimated planes on hand, December 1943 ____ __ __ _______ ____ 120, 000
Estimated production, 194L. ----- -- --------- ---------- --- - __ 19,300
Estimated production, 1942.-------- ------------------- -- - ___ 47,000
900
Estimated production, 1943. _-- --- ------------- ------------ -- 85,000
2, 660
5, 480

I. Estimated increase in United States first-liue plaues:
(a) Army and Navy first-line planes:

/

December:
194L. __ --------------------------------- - ------------1942.--------- --- -------------------------------------1943_-- ---------- --- - --- --- -- - ----- -- --- --------- -- ----(b) Fighter planes:
December:
194L. _---- ---------- -- ---- ---- -- --- ----- ----- -- ------1942.---- --------------------- --- ---------------------1943_--- ·------------------------- - ----- -- ------ - --· - -(c) 4-engine bombers :
December:
100
194L .. -------------- -- -------------------------------1942.- ---- ----------- -- --- ------ ---- -- ----- ---- ---- -- --300
1943.- - --- -- - ------- --- --- --- --- --- ----- -------- - --- --- 2, 690

APPENDIX A-4. A COMPARISON OF
(ESTIMATED) JAPANESE AND AMERICAN MILITARY RESOURCES AT THE
END OF THE WAR
A. Estimated A merican Military Resources
N ea r the End of the Wa r
1. Main Na·oal Forces (l!JJ,.5):
Type of ship

End of
July

End of
August

Notes

-Aircraft carriers

Escort carriers __

t

25/28

26/28

74/89

70/85

Battleships ____

23/23

I

24/24

Cruisers ____ ___ -I

35/64

I

36/64

Destroyers _____ _! 244/324

I

251/331

l. This table is based on figure~ pub-

lished in the United States at the
end of April, modified by the results achieved by the OP!'ration for
defense of Okinawa. (The last
figure represents total, the first
represents the number assigned to
operations against Japan.)
2. Of ships and vessels badly damaged
in the operation for the defense of
Okinawa, about half were made
operational during the period from
February to March, while the
other half were rendered operational from March to April.
3. New aircraft carriers became operational as follows: Antietam, end of
June, Tarawa, end of July, and
Bo1·er, end of August. rrhe Sara·
toga and RangfT used in training,
are not included .
4. Escort carriers transferred to England and those lost prior to the
Okinawa operation are included in
figures for total escort carriers.
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2. Air Forces (191,.5):

I

End or
End or
August
September
1----- - - -

End of
July

Area

- - - - - - ·- - - - - 1
Northern
Alaskaarea:
____________________________ _
Aleutians ____ ___ _____ ____ __ ___ ____ _
Ellis-Gilberts-Samoa Area ________ _
Marshalls ___ ___ _______ ____ ____ - ---Marianas _____________________ __ ___
Central Pacific:
Pcleliu;
--------- --- --- ____ _
Iwo
JimaUlithL
_________________________
_
HawaiL _------------------- ______ _
Transport planes .--- - - -- - --- -----(Philippine Islands) - ------- --- ___ _
Ryukyu Islands (Nansei Shoto) _______ _
New Guinea-Australia Area:
Eastern New Guinea ____ ___ ___ ___ _
Western New Guinea _______ ______ _

I

400
300
150
200
1,000

400
300
150
200
1,000

400
300
150
200
1,000

250
500
900
200
3,100
f>OO

250
500
1. 200
200
4,100
G50

250
500
1,500
200
5,100
870

300
000

300

300
()()0

GOO

NoTE.-It is anticipatert that some of the forces now in the European
nbont the end of July.

End of
July

Area

End of
August

ISeptember
End or

- - - - - - - -·-- - - - - New Guinea-Australia Area-Contd.
Australia ______________ _____ _______
South Pacific:
Solomon Islands __ ______________ ___
New Caledonia: Espiritu Santo._.
Fiji__ ________________________ ______
New Zealand ________ ______________
India-Burma '£heater________________ __
China:
American Air Force _______________
American-Chinese Air Force _______
India-China transport planes ___ _______
Fleet Air Forces _________________ ______
Totals ___________________________

~rheater

250

250

200
300
100
100
I, .100

200
300
100
100
2, 000

100
100
2,000

700
150
400
3, 700

800
150
400
3.800

800
150
400
3,SOO

Hi.OOO

17, S50

Hl,:l7!l

of Occupation will make their appearancP in thufil'

250
200

:mo

thpat,~rs f'tn rt.in ~

Supplementary Table (on Planes (1945))
End of August

End or Jul y

End of Sppt.

~----------------1------ -------------- l----- ------------l----------------------

B-29s. _______________ ________ ___ 850
Others. ________________________ ------TotaL ------------------------- 1, 000
B- 29s. __ ---------------· _______
50
Iwo
B-24s . ____________ ______ ____ ___ !50
P -5Is . _----------------- -----·- 250
P - 61s . _________ ---------------30
Others. __---------------------10
TotaL -- ------ ----------------- 500
Ryukyu Islands (Nansei Shoto) __ __ P-47s, P-51s and P--61s _________ 300
Carrier planes -------------- - -- 100
B-24s_ __________________________ 150
PVs . _________ ---------- _______
30
PBYs .. ------------- - ---------40
TotaL - -- --------------------- - GOO
[sic]
Philippines arcn __---- ----- -- ____ ___ _ ll'ight.rt'.S _______________________ 1. 500
Bomhrr5 (i ncludin~ 300 B-29s,
R-17s, cl.c, an increase of 70
B-21s) ____ ------------- ____ _ 1, 000
Others._ ---------------------50
'.l'otnl _______ . ______
_ ______ 2. MO
Marianas (Islands) area_

No change_

No change.
B- 29s are
B-29s.

No ch ange.

300
100
200
30
40
650
[sic]
Fighters . ______________________ 2, 000
Bomber~ (including 400 B-29s;
others same as prcced in.!!
[sic]) ______ ______ _________ _____ 2. 000
Others .. ----- --- - ---- - --------- 100
Total .----------------· _________ 4. 100

P-47s, P -.1 1s a nd P--61s ________ __
Carrier planes ___________________
B-24s. ___ ------------------- ____
PVs. __________ ----------------PBYs ... _______ -----------------TotaL ____ _______ - --- --- ---- -----

400
100
300
30
40
870

Fighters _______________________ _ 2, 500
Fighters (including 500 B-29s;
others same as preceding [sic])_ 2, 000
Others .________________ ___ ______ 100
TotaL . -·--------- _________
_ 5,100
[siej

B. j apanese Military R esources Near the End
of the War
E nd or
July

Branch or Arm

End or
August

Japan's national power has grown progressively
weaker with the loss of the Philippine Islands and
Okinawa. All of our existing aircraft are being
converted (to suicide planes). We are Goncentrating on the conversion (to defense of the homeland) of a large part of the special submarine
attack forces, which can be turned out with comparative ease. We plan to enhance our military
resources through increased production of such
items as twin-engine, twin-boom cargo planes
(KI 115). Nevertheless, a certain amount of
apprehension is still felt.
1. Air forces:

-- --Army:
Infantry divisions _____ _______ _
Armored divisions __________ _
Airborne 'divisions _________ _
Cavalry divisions ________ ._

53/90
7/22
3/ 10
1/2

70/90
10/22
4/ 10
1/2

64/ 134
7/ 10

85/134
8/10

71/144

93/144

-----------

NOTES
a. The figures in this table are based on the following estimates:
(1) Since May, 2 divisions per month have been sent from the United
States to participate in operations against Japan.
(2) About one-hall of the approximately 60 divisions assigned to the western
European Theater or Operations have been redeployed against Japan, as
shown below:
Departed European Theater
of Operations

Not known whether
replaced with

bein~

P-47s, P-5ls and P--6ls ______ ___
Carrier planes ___ ___ ___________ _
B-24s. _------------------------PVs __
PBYs __
Tota L

3. Groundforces (191,.5):

Military
strength
(number or
divisions)

No change.

Arrived Philippine Islands

area

Ready for operations

Fighters _____________________________________ _ 1, 170
Night fighters ________________________________ _
125
Small bombers _ ___ ~ _______________________ ___ _
636
Fighter bombers _____________________
60
Bombers. ______________ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
3,10
Attack planes __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
266
Medium bombers ____ ____________________ _____ _
352
Medium land-attack planes ___________
197
Land bombers ._____________ _ _ __ _ _ _
155

(I) About 10 _____ 1 Middle to end of

I End of July _____ l End of August.
May.
(2) About20 _____ June ____ __ _______ End of August___ End of September.
I

Explanaiion: Equipment necessary lor redeployed forces and munitions
reqwred for operations have been shipped to the Philippines area directly
from the United States.
(b) In the monthly figures in the main table above, the second figure represents the total number of divisions; the first represents the number assigned
to operations against Japan.
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Seaplanes __ _______ __________________ __ _______ _

398

Reconnaissance seaplanes _____________
348
F lying boats ___________________ ____ _
10
Seaplane bombers__ _________________
40
Single engine reconnaissance planes (MYRT) __ __ _
Other serviceable planes ____________ __________ _ _

70
75

men and his intimates to solicit their views on
Japan's war situation and advice concerning the
immediate future of the Empire. On 14 February
1945 Prince Konoye had such an interview with
the Emperor. In advance of that, Prince Konoye
prepared a memorandum of his views which were
verbally presented to the Emperor. An English
translation of tho memorandum, prepared by T.
Ushiba, Konoyc's long-time private secretary, is
reproduced below. Copies of the translation and
the original memorandum were given to the Survey
at Kar uizawa on 30 November 1945 .
Pa rts of the following translation arc not literal
rend itions of tho original Japanese but represent
an accurate summary of salient points. T he
method of summarization employed by the translator, Mr. Ushiba, consists of omitting the less
important examples cited by Konoye in support
of conclusions. For instance, the examples of
alleged Russian political infiltration in France,
Jugoslavia, Belgium, etc. , have been omitted from
the second paragraph. In all cases the conclusions
remain intact. It is believed that tho omission of
minor supporting arguments in a few instances
does not detract sufficiently from the import of the
document as a whole to justify a literal translation
of the original in its entirety.

SubtotaL ________ _____ ________________ _ 2, 826
Trainers:
Medium trainers ______________ __ ____ 1, 900
Shiragiku (reconnaissance trainers) ____
318
SubtotaL __________________________ ____ 2, 218
Grand totaL _________ __________ ________ 5, 044

2. Special attack .forcPs:

~

Underwater demo lition units ___________________ _
Surface suic ide boats (torpedo equipped) __ _____ __
Manual torpedoes _____________________ _______ _
Suicide boats (with bomb for explosion) _________ _ 2,

100
300
120
000

3. Ships and small craft:

Ships and small craft are not being stressed,
because in view of the present state of the fuel
supply, they can be used only as harbor antiaircraft defense ships.

C. Enemy Losses E xpected in the Operation fo r
the Defense of the Homeland
1. Estimate of the number of transports it
would be possible to destroy in the event of an
American attack on the homeland
Estimate for the coming attack on the Kyushu
Area in about September.

*

*

*

*

*

I think that there is no longer any doubt about
our defeat. A defeat is, of course, a serious stain
on our history, but we can accept it, so long as we
can maintain our Tcnno system. Public opinion
in America and Britain on the whole is not yet, at
least, so bad as to demand a fundamental change
in that system. ·what we have to fear, therefore,
is not so much a defeat as a Communist revolution
which might take place in the event of defeat.
Conditions, internal as well as external, point to
tho danger of such revolution. In the first
place, there has been a notable ascendancy of
Soviet Russia in world politics. In the light of
her recent activities in Europe, we must judge
that she has not abandoned the hope of bolshcvising the whole world. She is prosecuting such a
policy vis a vis the Far East, and I fear interference
in our domestic affairs.
With regard to internal affairs, potentially
dangerous factors include the rapid deterioration
of the people's living conditions, increase in the
voice of the laboring classes, rise of pro-Soviet
feelings as enmity against America and Britain
increases, attempts by an extremist group in the

Total number of transports, about ____ ______ _ 2, 000
Probable number which would be sunk, about _ · 470
(Basis for calculations omitted.)

Thus, with about three-fourths able to make a
landing, it would be difficult to defeat American
plans through annihilation on the sea.
2. If there should be successive delays in the
attack, it would appear profitable from a purely
tactical point of view to build up gradually the
submarine special attack forces. It will be difficult
to maintain om air power unless, despite intense
air raids, pwduction levels can be maintained, and
special measures devised to increase the production of fuels so that a monthly output of about
30,000 tons of aviation gasoline is assured.

APPENDIX A- 5. MEMORANDUM O F
K O N OYE CONVERSATION WITH
HIROHITO, FEBRUARY 194 5.
Early in February 1945 the Emperor initiated a
number of private interviews with the elder states-
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twice during that period, and over-eager to bring
about national unity by accepting as much as
possible of the doctrine advocated by those radical
elements, I failed to perceive the true intentions
hidden behind their arguments. I do not pretend
to find any excuse for my short-sightedness, but
I feel responsible for it.
In the last few months, the slogan "Hundred
Million Die Together" has become increasingly
louder, seemingly among the right-wing people,
but has its real basis in the activities of the Communists.
Under such circumstances, the longer we continue the war, the greater will be the danger of
revolution. We should therefore stop the war as
soon as possible.
The greatest obstacle to ending the war is the
existence of the military group which has been
"propelling" the country into the present state
ever since the Manchurian Incident-the group
which, having already lost all hope of successfully
concluding the war, nevertheless insists on its
continuation in order to save face. If we try to
stop the ·war abruptly, these military extremists
together with both the right and left wings, might
attempt anything-even a bloody internal revolt,
and thereby nullify our efforts. The prerequisite
to the conclusion of the war, therefore, is to wipe
out the influence of these dangerous people and
reform the Army and Navy. I must urge Your
Majesty to make a serious decision to that end.

military to achieve radical changes in internal
politics, activities of younger bureaucrats sympathetic with that group, and disguised activities of
the Communists behind both the military and
bureaucrats.
A majority of younger officers seem to think
that the present form of the Japanese Government
is compatible with Communism- a conception
which, in any opinion, constitutes the basis of the
radical thought of the military. The Communists
are influencing them with the theory that, even
under communism, Japan can maintain the Tenno
system. I have now come to seriously doubt
whether the whole series of events from the Manchurian Incident to the present war have not been
what they have purposefully planned. It is a
well-known fact that they openly declared the aim
of the Manchurian war was to achieve drastic
reforms in domestic affairs. A central figure of
theirs also declared that the longer the China
Incident continued, the better, for otherwise, the
intended reform would not be accomplished. Of
course, the "reform" aimed at by the military may
not necessarily be a Communist revolution, but
the group of bureaucrats and civilians (both left
and right) who are in a close collaboration with
the military are definitely intending to bring about
such a revolution. In the light of this conclusion,
I now realize that I have, during the last ten years,
· come across many events the meaning of which
I did not then fully appreciate. Prime Minister
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APPENDIX B- BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE LEADERS
ANAMI, K orechika

Apr 1920- Lived in France, studied military
tactics.
1926- Honorary President of Japan
Newspaper Association.
Dec 1929- Major general staff officer, General
Headquarters.
1930- Commander of Fifth Infantry
Brigade.
Aug 1934- Lieutenant general; commander of
Fourth Army Division.
Dec 1935- Appointed Supreme War Councilor.
Aug 1937- Chief of Military Aviation Department.
Apr 1938- Commander of Second Army; took
part in China mainland fighting.
Jan 1939- Supreme War Councilor.
Aug 1939- General.
1940- Again served in China; awarded
the Order of the Golden Kite,
First class.
Dec 1941- Commander in Chief of Home
Defense Headquarters and concurrently Supreme War Councilor.
Jul 1944-Resigned as Commander in Chief,
Home Defense Headquarters.
18 Aug 1945- Commaaded to form a new
cabinet.
5 Oct 1945- President of Diet structure investigation council.

21 Feb 1887- Born, Oita prefecture.
1907- Graduated, Military Academy.
1918- Graduated, Army War College.
- Army General Staff.
1934- Director Military Affairs Bureau,
War Ministry.
Mar 1,938- Lt. General.
Oct 1939- Vice Minister of War (under
General Hata, Sunroku, in
Abe and Yonai cabinets and
under General Tojo, Hideki,
in second Konoye and Tojo
cabinets.)
Apr 1941- Commander of an Army Corps on
China Front.
10 Apr 1943- General.
1 Dec 1943- Commander of 2nd Army.
26 Dec 1944- Inspector General of :M ilitary
Aviation; Supreme War Councilor and Director of Army
Aviation Headquari:,ers.
7 Apr 1945- War Minister in new Suzuki
cabinet.
30 Apr 1945- Adviser to the War Relief Association.
14 Aug 1945- Committed suicide with Japan's
surrender and the fall of the
Suzuki Cabinet.
16 Aug 1945- Funeral services held at the War
Ministry.

Personal background:
Higashikuni was an Imperial Prince who had
been little more th m a figurehead in any of his
army posts. Early in 1942 he was reported to
have been associated with Prince Konoye in
organizing the Showa Kenkyu Kai for the purpose of overthrowing the TOJO regime and getting
a peace with the United States while Jap m still
had vast empire and before the United Sta.tes
could rearm. In December 1944, it was again
reported that he was active in organizing a party
to overthrow the present regime, especially if the
United States were to invade Japan proper.

HIGASHIKUNI, Naruhiko, Prince
Career:

3 Dec 1887- Born, Kyoto.
Nov 1906- Established House of Higashikuni
by order of the late Emperor
Meiji.
1908-Graduated from the Military
Academy.
1914- Graduated, · :my War College.
1915- Conimander of Twenty-ninth Infantry Brigade; captain.
Jul 1918- Major; battalion commander of
Seventh Infantry Division.
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HIRANUMA, Kiichiro, Baron

Jul

Career:
28 Sep 1865-Born, Okayama prefecture.
1888--Graduated, Tokyo Imperial University, Law school; entered
Justice Ministry.
1890- Judge of Tokyo Imperial Court.
Judge and Department Director
of Tokyo Court of Appeals
Councilor of Justice Ministry.
1905- Director of Civil and Criminal
Affairs Bureau, Justice Ministry.
1906- Went to Europe and America.
1907- Received LL.D.
Aug 1911-Vice Minister of Justice in second
Saionji cabinet, serving under
Justice Minister Matsuda.
1912-Appointed Procurator General,
Vice President of Privy Council.
1918- Referred to as head of Tokyo
Imperial University.
1921-Appointed Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court.
1923-1924-Minister of Justice in second
Yamamoto cabinet.
1924- Imperial nominee to the House of
Peers.
- Appointed to the Privy Council.
-Lecturer at Tokyo Imperial University.
-President of Kokuhonsha, a rightist organization.
-President of Shuyodan, youth
auxiliary of Kokuhonsha.
1926-Appointed Vice President of the
Privy Council.
1927--Made a baron.
- President of Nihon University.
1936- Elected President of the Privy
Council and resigned as president of Kokuhonsha and Shuyodan.
Jan 1939- Premier, succeeding Konoye when
it became clear that Konoye
could not liquidate the China
War.
1940-Minister-without-portfolio, then
Home Minister in second Konoye cabinet.

Mar

Jul
Aug
Aug
30 Jun
7 Aug

2 Dec

1941-Appointed Minister-without-portfolio in third Konoye cabinet.
1941-Brought about drastic changes in
the IRAA, and opposed totalitarian reform of Hoshino, N aoki
the president of the Planning
Board and forced him to resign
in April 1941.
1941-Forced out Matsuoka in Cabinet
shake-up.
1941-2 attempts on his life; on August
14 wounded badly.
1942-Went on official visit to Nanking.
1945-Chairman of Council of Home
Defense League.
1945-President of Privy Council, succeeding Suzuki who became
Premier.
1945-0rdered arrested as a war criminal.

Personal background:

After World War I, Baron Hiranuma lent his
support to various patriotic societies, the purpose
of which was to combat Leftist tendencies among
the students. Together with the leaders of these
societies he formed a group to carry on nationalistic propaganda beyond the university. This
group formed the basis for the Kokuhonsha. As
Chairman of the House of Peers in 1924 and Vice
President of the Privy Council in 1926, under his
guidance this institution restrained even the
insignificant attempts of the Kato and W akatsuki
cabinets to introduce reforms. Finally in the
conflict arising with the Wakatsuki cabinet over
the question of granting aid to the banluupt Bank
of Taiwan, Hiranuma secured the fall of the
W akatsuki cabinet and the assumption of 'the
premiership by the leader of the most reactionary
wing of the Japanese bourgeoise, Gen. Giichi
Tanaka. When he became Premier in 1939 his
extreme reactionary views toned down. The
attempts on his life in 1941 were instigated by
Nakano, Seigo, of the Tohokai, in collaboration
with certain members of the German Embassy.
He was reported opposed to the war with the
United States. Five members of his cabinet were
in Koiso's cabinet. Koiso's Justice Minister
Matsuzaka, Hiromasa, was a protege of Hiranuma.
Until General Tojo took over full power in
October 1941, Baron Hiranuma was unquestionably the most powerful and influential figure in
Japanese politics. As Minister-without-Portfolio
in the second Konoye cabinet, he was in effect the
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de fact() Premier. Lt. General Heisuke Yanegawa
(ret.), Justice Minister in the second Konoye
Cabinet, was also one of Baron Hiranuma's
proteges, and it was through him that Hiranuma
attempted to effect drastic reforms in the IRAA to
curb extreme reactionary activities.
Ideologically, Baron Hiranuma was an archfundamentalist. He did more than any other
single individual to popularize nationalistic Shinto
and the politico-religious concept of Kodo, or the
Imperial way. His fundamentalism, however, did
not keep pace with the more extreme forms of
nationalism and reaction which developed. under
the guidance of the Tojo clique, and by 1941
Hiranuma found himself on the defensive. He
:was particularly concerned that the new totalitari"an principles expressed by the Tojo group would
tend toward a dictatorship in which the theoretically omnipotent position of the Emperor would
be jeopardized. Hiranuma also strongly opposed
the conclusion of the Axis alliance, partly out of
fear that too close association with Germany would
further encourage such totalitarian developments
in Japan.

Jun

1942-Appointed special emissary to
Thailand.
23 Oct 1943-Assisted in the organization of the
Peace Society Heiwa Kai to
promote friendly relations with
the Southern Regions.
14 Jan 1944- Attended a meeting sponsored by
Tokama, Mitsuru; later was
chairman for committee for
funeral of Tokama.
14 Sep 1945- Removed from list of Black
Dragon members wanted for
questioning.
No explanation
gtven.
2 Dec 1945- 0rdered arrested as a war criminal.
Personal Background:
A libei·al, broad-minded, and able diplomat.
It is believed that the Army was behind his
appointment in replacing Uchida in 1933 in order
to avert hostilities with Russia. Hirota was a
protege of Tokama, Mitsuru; was also presiding
officer at directors meeting of the Black Dragon
Society. Stated that the war with the United
States had best begin in December or February of
1941.

HIROTA, Koki
INOUE, Shigeyoshi, Admiral

Career:

Mar
Jun
.5 Feb

24 Feb
26 Feb
4 Mar
5 Mar
5 Mar

1878-Born Kukuoka-ken.
1905-Graduated, Tokyo Imperial University, politics; entered the
foreign service, served in Peking.
1909- Served in London.
1918- First Secretary, Washington.
1922-Subd.irector, Intelligence Bureau.
1926- Minister to Netherlands.
1932- Ambassador to Russia.
1936--Foreign Millister in Saito and
Okada cabinets.
1936- Premier until February 1937.
1937-Foreign Minister until May 1938 .
1938-Spoke before the Diet about the
progress of the China War and
relations with the United States.
1938-·Busy defending the National Mobilization Bill.
1938- "Japan plans to halt Naval Race."
1938-"Sorry for America if she fortifies
Hawaii", etc.
1938- Urged abolition of capital ships.
1938 - Said Japan would behead Chiang
Kai-Shek. Said peace offers to
Chiang bad been rejected.

Career:

1889190919101921-

Born.
Graduated, Naval Academy.
Ensign.
Lieutenant commander. Graduated, Higher Naval College.
1924- Military Affairs Bureau; Naval
Technical Council.
1927- Naval attache, Rome, Paris, and
Berne.
1929- Captain.
- Shipbuilding and ordnance inspector, Technical Department;
ordnance inspector, Aviation
Department.
1930-Instructor, Higher Naval College.
1932- 1933- Chief, First Section, Military ft,ffairs Bureau; Naval Training
College.
- Commanding officer, BB Hiei.
1935- Chief of staff, Yokosuka Naval
District.
15 Nov 1935- Rear admiral. ·
1936- Navy General Staff and Navy
Department.
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15 Nov 1937-Director, Military Affairs Bureau;
Board of Admirals.
Oct 1939- Chief of staff, China Area Fleet.
15 Nov 1939- Vice admiral.
1940- Director, Naval Aviation Department.
Aug 1941- Commander in Chief, Second Fleet.
1942- Director, Naval Academy.
Nov 1942- Commanderin Chief, Fourth Fleet.
5 Aug 1944- Succeeded as Director, Naval
Academy, by Vice Admiral
Okochi, Denshichi; Navy Vice
Minister, succeeding Vice Admiral Oka, Takazumi; Board of
Admirals (Imperial Headquarters).
6 Nov 1944- Chief, Naval Technical Department, relieving Vice Admiral
Sugiyama, Rokuzo.
18 Nov 1944- Relieved of above post by Vice
Admiral Shibuya, Ryutaro.
1 May 1945- Chief, Naval Aviation Headquarters (concurrent) .
15 May 1945- Admiral. Supreme War Councilor. Succeeded as Navy Vice
Minister by Vice Admiral Tada,
Talmo : Succeeded as Commander in Chief, Naval Aviation
Headquarters, by Vice Admiral
Wada, Misao.
15 Oct 1945- Relieved of posts in demobilization of Navy personnel.

KIDO, Koichi, Marquis

1917- Chief, First Section, Emergency
Industrial Rationing Bureau.
1929- Delegate to Berlin International
Parliamentary Trade Congress.
1930- Chief Secretary to Lord Keeper of
the Privy Seal.
1937- Education Minister.
- Director, Bureau of Peerage and
Heraldry, Imperial Household.
Ministry.
1938- Concurrently, Welfare Minister.
1939- Home Minister.
-:-House of Peers.
1940- Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.
Jul 1944_:_Active in selecting Premier Koiso
to succeed Tojo.
Dec 1944- Reported to be one of group
secretly plotting to overthrow
present regime and to set up
new government headed by
Hih, Prince Higashikuni, N aruhiko, and to ask United States
for peace terms.
6 Dec 1945- 0rdered arrested as war criminal.
Background:
A member of the Tokyo aristocracy, he had long
been associated politically with Prince Konoye,
Fumimaro, and was backed by the latter and by
the Army for the post of Lord Keeper of the Privy
Seal, to replace Yuasa, Kurahei, whom the Army
considered too liberal an adviser to the Emperor.

KISHI, Shinsuke (Nobusuke)

Career:
Career:
Nov 1896- Born.
1920- Graduated, Tokyo Imperial University (law).
- Secretary, Industry Department,
Industry Rationalization Unemployment Problems Committee.
-Director, Industry Bureau, Commerce and Industry Ministry. ·
1936- Director, Industry Bureau, Manchukuo Industry Department.
1937-39-Vice Minister of Industry Department, Manchukuo.
-Director, Patent Bureau, Manchukuo.

1889- Born, Yamaguchi Prefecture.
1915- Graduated, Kyoto Imperial University (law and politics).
1917- Inherited title.
- Secretary, Emergency Industrial
Inspection Bureau, Agricultural
and Commerce Minister.
- Councilor, Agriculture and Commerce Ministry.
1917- Secretary, F~shery Bureau.
- Chief, Industrial Section, Industrial Bureau, Commerce and
Industry Ministry.
- Chief, Accounts and Documents
Sections, Commerce and Industry Ministry.
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Mar 1939-Assistant director, General Affairs
Board, State Council, Manchukuo.
- Returned to Japanese Government to assume post as Vice
Minister, Commerce and Industry.
1943- Relieved of post as Commerce and
Industry Minister.
Post assumed concurrently by Premier
Tojo.
- Minister-without-Portfolio and
Vice Minister of Commerce and
Industry.
Nov 1944-Member, House of Representatives.
16 Sep 1945-Taken into custody as a war crim-inal.
Kishi and Lt. General Teiichi Suzuki drafted
the Munitions Company Act for the Tojo cabinet,
which later caused much friction between Army
and industrialists. Kishi was a civilian member
of the so-called Manchurian clique and his political
and economic ideas were to a good extent shaped
by experiences with state planning under the
aegis of the Kwantung Army.

Personal background:
Strongly pro-Axis and anti-Russian. At the
time of his appointment as overseas minister in
1939, his outspoken and positive views were
expected to bring an immediate strengthening of
Japan's continental policy. An intimation of hi:;
character may be obtained h·om his nickname
"the Tiger of Korea" and the fact that he had
claimed to be a staunch believer that all problems
could be solved by the "Imperial Way". He
was one of the most out-spoken of the politically
minded in the Army; was closely associated with
the single party movement; and had worked in
the Kokuhonsha with Baron Hiranuma. Lieutenant General Kimura, Haruo, stated that Koiso
gave the order to invade French Indochina. He
was alleged also to have been a member of the
Black Dragon Society. He was a member of the
Japanese Imperial Headquarters while he was
Premier in order to have status equal to that of
the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff, an unpre~
cedented action sanctioned by Hirohito. Other
evidence indicates that there was considerable
personal friction between Koiso and Tojo.

K OISO, Kunikai, Gener al

"

29 May 1942- Governor General of Korea.
19 J ul 1944- Retired as Governor General, Korea, in order to accept job of
forming new cabinet.
22 Jul 1944- Formed new cabinet with himself
as Premier.
10 Feb 1945---Reorganized his cabinet as the
result of pressure from the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and other malcontent elements, and made changes which
represented a personal loss rather than a change of great
political significance.
19 Feb 1945- Chairman of wartime Price Investigation Committee.
2 Apr 1945- Commander in Chief of Volunteer
Corps which was to be established on a national basis under
a central headquarters.
5 Apr 1945-Resigned with entire cabinet the
same day Russia renounced
Neutrality Pact with Japan.
Emperor immediately named
Suzuki to form a new cabinet.
19 Nov 1945- 0rdered arrested as a war criminal.

Career:
Mar 1880-Born, Y amagata-ken.
190 1- Second lieutenant.
1901-31-Commander of Fifty-First Infantry Regiment; Director of General Affairs Section, A v1ation
Headquarters; member of General Staff.
1931- Director of Military Affairs Bureau
during the Manchurian Incident; War Vice Minister.
1932- Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army.
1934- Commander of Fifth Division
(Hiroshima).
1935- ·Commander of Korean Army.
Nov 1937- General, attached to Army General Staff.
1938- Retired.
7 Apr 1939- Assumed office of Overseas Minister, relieving Hatta, ' Yoshiaki.
Held this post through Hiranuma and Y onai cabinets.
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K O N O YE, Fumimaro, Prince

9 Oct

1945- Named adviser to the Lord Keeper
of the Privy Seal.
23 Nov 1945- Relieved as special adviser to Lord
Privy Seal after he submitted
recommendations revising the
Japanese constitution.
Dec 1945- Committed suicide.
Konoye has been labeled at various times
radical, moderate, totalitarian. He was president
of the Far East, Siam, Indo-China, Japan-Nei,
and South Seas Associations, and would seem to
have been fundamentally nationalistic, whatever
his temporary political attitude. He was considered friendly to the United States, and sent his
son to Princeton.
In 1942, he was active in the organization and
work of Showa Kenyu Kai, an anti-Tojo organization, and in late 1944 he was reported to be one of
a group secretly planning the overthrow of the
present regime in favor of a new government
headed by Prince Higashikuni, N aruhiko, should
Japan proper be invaded by the United States.
This move included the possibility of asking the
United States for peace terms.
Prince Konoye also enjoyed close connection
with some of the more extreme patriotic societies.
This was probably a heritage of his father's close
personal friendship with the late Mitsuru Toyama,
head or sponsor of some of the most violent
societies, including the famous Black Dragon
Society. Although his father, Prince Atsumaro
Konoye, died in his 40's, he had promise of becoming an outstanding political figure and may
be regarded as one of the first "nationalistic
liberals" in Japanese politics.

Career:
1891-Born.
1904-Succeeded to title.
1916- House of Peers.
1917-Graduated, Kyoto Imperial University (la political science).
1918- Entered Home Ministry as nonregular staff member, stationed
in Europe.
1919- Delegate to Paris Peace Conference, in suite of Prince Saionji.
1924- Councilor, Bureau of Peerage and
Heraldry.
1926- Cultural Investigation Committee.
- Lord in waiting of the Musk Hall.
1927- Chief Commissioner of the Imperial Coronation; charged with
program of the accession to the
throne of the present Emperor.
1931- 1933- Vice President, House of Peers.
1933- President, House of Peers.
· 1933- 0ne of the founders of Greater
Asia Society.
1934- Travelled to the United States to
promote friendly relations.
Jun
19371
p
.
F'rrst K onoye C a b'met.
Jan 1939 f- rem1er,

r'

Jan
1939} - p res1.d ent, p nvy
. C ounc1.1.
Jun 1940
Jan 1939} - l\,r·
.
. h out- p ortf ow,
H.lra1.
Aug
·.umster-w1t.
1939
Jul1940l
nu~a Cabmet.
.
Jul 1941 f-Prem1er, second Konoye cabmet.
Jul 1941} - p rem1er,
. Tl.
Oct
11rd K onoye ca b'met.
1941
1940- Founded Imperial Rule Assistance
Association.
1942-Active in organization and work
of Showa Kenkyu Kai.
·
1943- Adviser to IRAA.
1944- Representative of the Koa Dantai
Rengokai in the Greater East
Asia Ministry.
- Representative of the Daitoa Rem-

MATSUDAIRA, Tsuneo

Career:
Apr 1877- Born, Tokyo.
1902-Graduated, Tokyo Imperial University (political science.) Attached to Legation in Pekmg.
1907- Third Secretary, Embassy in London and Paris.
. 1910- Second Embassy Secretary.
- Second Secretary, Legation m
Peking.
1914-Consul General, Tientsin.
1918-Councilor, Embassy in Washington, D. C.
1914-1920-Chief Diplomatic Commission,
Siberian Expeditionary Force.

meL

Jul

1944- Active in organization of Koiso
cabinet.
Apr 1945- Active in organization of Suzuki
cabinet.
16 Aug 1945-- Named Minister-without-Portfolio
in Higashikuni cabinet.
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Sep .1923-Vice Foreign Minister.
-Concurrently Director Intelligence
Department.
1924-Ambassador to Washington.
1929-1930-Delegate to Tenth and Eleventh
League of Nations Conferences,
Geneva.
1929-Delegate to London Naval Conference.
1931-Delegate, Geneva Disarmament
Conference.
1932-Delegate to League of Nations
Conference at Geneva.
until 1936-Ambassador to Court of St.
James, London.
Mar 1936-Minister of Imperial Household.
30 Apr 1945-Adviser to Sensai Engokai (Wartime Relief Association).
4 Jun 1945-Resigned as Imperial Household
Minister because of bombing of
Palace:
Matsudaira was the very epitome of the socalled "liberal, pro-American, pro-British" clique
which allegedly surrounded the Throne and which
was the prime target of the young officers and
other patriotic assassins. Matsudaira's daughter
married Prince Chichibu, the present Emperor's
eldest brother.

OIKAW A, Koshiro, Admiral

Career:

1883190319131915-

191919221923192419261928Jul

1932-

Born, Iwate prefecture.
Graduated Naval Academy.
Higher Naval College.
Graduated Higher Naval College;
aide to Grown Prince, served as
aide-de-camp for 7 years.
Commander.
Commanding officer, Fourteenth
Destroyer Division.
Captain.
Commanding officer, CL Tama.
Navy General Staff and Naval
Training College.
Chief instructor and discipline
officer, Naval Academy.
Rear Admiral, Chief of Staff,
Kure Naval District.
Aide to special inspector appointed by Emperor.

Nov 1932-Commanding Officer, First Air
Flotilla of First Fleet.
15 Nov 1933-Vice Admiral.
Dec 1935- Commander in Chief, Third Fleet.
Dec 1936- Director, Naval Aviation Department.
Apr 1938- Commander in Chief, Third Fleet.
15 Nov 1939- Admiral. Commander in Chief,
Yokosuka Naval District.
1 Jan 1940- Commander in Chief, China Area
Fleet.
Sept 1940- Navy Minister.
20 Oct 1941- Supreme War Councilor.
Nov 1942- Director, Higher Naval College.
1943- Supreme War Councilor.
17 Nov 1943- Reported to be Commander in
Chief, Grand Surface Escort.
9 Aug 1944- Chief, Navy General Staff, relieving Admiral Shimada, Shigetaro.
29 May 1945- Supreme War Councilor; succeeded as Chief, Navy General
Staff by Admiral Soemu
Toyoda.
Personal Background:

He was supposed to have had influence with the
Emperor due to a close personal connection during
Emperor's adolescence. Considered to be one of
ablest Japanese naval officers. A strong proponent of southward expansion, but tende'd to
favor diplomatic and covert naval pressure in
place of overt mi'litary action.

OKADA, Keisuke, Admiral (retired)

Career:
Jan 1867-

-
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Born, Fukui prefecture.
Graduate, Naval Staff College.
Director, Torpedo School.
Commander, 2nd Squadron.
Commanding Officer, 1st and 3rd
Torpedo Squadron.
Director, Personnel Bureau, Navy
Ministry.
Director, Sasebo Na:val Arsenal.
Director, Construction Bureau,
Navy Ministry.
Chief, Naval Construction Headquarters.
Vice Minister, Navy.
Supreme War Councilor.

SAKOMIZU, Hi.satsune
Career:
Aug 1902- Born, Kagoshima prefectme.
1926- Graduate, Tokyo Imperial University (law).
- Joined Finance Ministry.
1930- Financial Attache, New York .
1934-36- Private secretary to Premier Okada.
- Director, Financial Planning Section.
- Chief, General Affairs Bureau,
Financial Minis try.
- Staff, Cabinet Planning Board
under Tojo and Koiso .
- Chief cabinet secretary, Suzuki
cabinet.
1946- Candidate for Diet from Kago shima.
Personal Background:
Sakomizu is the son-in-law of former Premier
Okada: This important family connection gave
him considerable political influence despite his age .

-Commander in Chief; First and
Combined Fleets.
-Same, Y okosuka ~aval Station.
1927-Navy Minister.
1932-34-Same, SAIT O cabinet.
1934-36-Premier.
Personal background:
Okada was reported in December 1944 to be
one of a group secretly organizing a party to overthrow the regime, set up a new government headed
by Prince Higashikuni, and ask the United States
for peace terms. Hisatsune Sakomizu married
Okada's second daughter, Manki. In April 1945
Sakomizu became chief cabinet secretary in the
SUZUKI cabinet. As a retired premier, or Jushin,
_Okada wielded considerable political influence.
Today he is unquestionably one of the Emperor's
closest personal advisers.

O ZAWA, Jizaburo, Admiral

Career:

1
1
1
1
1

Jan
Jan
Dec
Jan
Jan

1 Jan
Nov
Sep
2 Jan
14 Jul
11 Dec
1 Mar

18 Nov
29 May

1886190919351936193619371939-

Born.
Graduated, Naval Academy.
Cominanding officer of CA Maya.
Cohunanding officer of BB Haruna.
Rear admiral.
Instructor, Higher Naval College.
Director, Torpedo School; Naval
Training College.
1940- Commanding officer, First Air
Flotilla.
1940- Vice admiral.
1941- Director, Higher Naval College.
1942- Commander in Chief, First Southe1·n Expeditionary Fleet.
1942- Navy General Staff.
1942- Commander in Chief, Third Fleet.
1944- Commander in Chief, First Mobile
Fleet; Commander in Chief,
Third Fleet.
1944-Vice Chief, Navy General Staff;
Director, Higher Naval College.
1945- Commander in Chief, Combined
Fleet.
_:_Commander in Chief, Over-all
Naval Command.
- Commander, Naval Escort Command.

SATO , Naotake

Career:
30 Oct 1882- Born, Osaka.
1904- Graduate, Tokyo Higher Commercial School.
- Entered Foreign Service.
1906- Attache, Embassy in St. Petersburg.
1914- Consul-General, Harbin.
1921- Minister to Poland.
1927-Director, Japanese Office, League
of N atiors, Paris.
1930- Ambassador to Belgium.
1933 ~ 1937-Ambassador to France.
Mar-Jun 1937- Foreign Minister.
Sep- Oct 1938- Advisor, Foreign Office.
Aug 1943- Ambassador to Moscow.
8 Aug 1943- Received notification of Russia's
declaration of war.
- Interned in the Embassy at
Moscow.
Sato favored friendly relations with Russia, was
considered liberal and an internationalist and was
reported to have stated in 1942 that the war between Japan and the United States was a regrettable mistake, but "we cannot stop now."
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SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru

Oa.reer:
29 Jul 1887-Born, Oita prt>fecture.
1911- Graduate, Tokyo Imperial University (law).
- Entered Foreign Service.
1911 - Germany.
1914 - England.
1916 - Third Secretary, London.
1918 - Consul in Poland.
1919 - Germany.
1920- Secretary, Foreign Office.
1923- 24 - Chief, First Secretary, Treaty
Bureau.
1925 - First Secretary, China.
1927 - Counsellor, Germany.
1929- 30 - Consul-General, Shanghai and
Embassy secretary.
1931- Minister to China.
1933- Vice Foreign Minister.
1933- 34- Chief, Research Bureau, Foreign
Office.
1936- Ambassador to Russia.
1938- Ambassador to England.
1939- First Ambassador to Nanking
Government.
1941- Named Foreign Minister after fall
of Konoye Cabinet.
1943- Foreign Minister in Tojo Cabinet.
27 Jul 1944- Foreign Minister, Koiso Cabinet.
-GEA Minister.
8 Apr 1945- Cabinet Minister privileges granted
by Emperor.
16 Aug 1945- Foreign Minister and GEA Ministry in Higashikuni Cabinet.
18 Sep 194,15- Resigned his post as Foreign Minister.

Commanding officer, CL Tama.
Commanding officer BB Hiei.
Rear Admiral.
Chief of Staff, Second Fleet.
Chief of Staff, Combined and First
Fleets.
1932-Director, Submarine school.
- Chief of Staff, Third Fleet.
1933- Chief, Third section, Navy General Staff; Naval Training College.
1934- Chief First section, Navy General Staff; Naval Training College.
1934- Vice Admiral.
1936- Vice Chief, Navy General Staff.
1937- Commander in Chief, Second Fleet.
1938- Com.mander in Chief, Kure Naval
District.
1940- Comm.ander in Chief, China Area
Fleet.
1940- Adm.iral.
1941- Commander in Chief, Yokosuka
Naval District.
1941- Navy Minister in Tojo cabinet.
1944- Concurrently, Chief Navy General
Staff, succeeding Admiral NOmura, Naokum.i.
1944- Resigned as Navy Minister, succeeded by Admiral Nomura,
Naokumi.
1944- Relieved as Chief Navy General
Staff by Admiral Oikawa, Koshiro.
- Supreme War Councillor.
1945- Placed on reserve list at own request.
1945- Arrested as war criminal.

192930 Nov 192919301931-

15 Nov
Dec
Nov

Nov

16 Oct
21 Feb

17 Jul

2 Aug

20 Jan
13 Sep

SHIMADA, Shigetaro, Admiral

Oa,reer:

SUZUKI, Kantaro, Admiral Baron

1883- Born, Tokyo.
1904-Graduated, Naval Academy.
1924- Captain, graduated from higher
Naval College.
-Naval attache, Rome; Navy General Staff.
1925- Instructor, Higher Naval College.
1927- Commanding officer, Seventh Sub
Division.
1928- Navy General Staff.

Career:
1867- Born, Chiba prefecture.
1887- Graduated Naval Academy.
1894- Lieutenant, commanding officer,
Torpedo Boat No. 6, during
Sino-Japanese War.
1895- Sank two Chinese warships blockaded in W eihaiwei.
1896- Graduated Naval Staff College.

31

-------

31 Dec

20 Feb
31 Jul

Jan
1 Dec
15 Apr

22 Jan
26 Feb
Nov
Jun
10 Aug

1898-Staff, Naval Affairs Bureau.
-Staff, Naval Training Department.
-Instructor at Naval and Military
Academy.
1903 - Sent to Germany and appointed
to bring home Kasuga.
1904 -Commanding officer, Kasuga and
Fourth Destroyer Flotilla in
Russo-Japanese War.
1906-Instructor, Higher Naval College.
commanding officer
1907 - Captain,
(OCL) Akashi and (OCL) Soya.
1908 -Captain, Akashi and Soya.
- Director, Naval Personnel Bureau.
1911-Director, Torpedo School.
1913 - Rear Admiral. Commanding officer, Maizuru Torpedo Division.
- Commander, Second Squadron.
- Chief, Navy Personnel Bureau.
1914- Vice-Minister of Navy in second
Okuma cabinet.
1916 - Director, Personnel Bureau.
1917 - Vice Admiral. Commander m
Chief, Training Squadron.
1918- Director, Naval Academy.
1919- Director, Naval Staff College.
1921- Commander in Chief, Second and
Third Squadrons and Kure
Naval Station, First Squadron.
1922- Commander in Chief, Fifth Fleet.
1922- Commander in Chief, Kure Naval
District.
1922- Commander in Chief, Sasebo Admiralty.
1923- Admiral.
1924- Commander in Chief, Combll4.ed
and First Fleets.
1924- Supreme War Council.
1925- Chief, Navy General Staff.
-Supreme War Council.
- Grand Chamberlain to Emperor.
1929- Reserve.
Grand Chamberlain;
Privy Council.
1936- Seriously wounded.
1936--Resigned as Grand Chamberlain
and granted rank of baron.
1940-Vice President, Privy CounciL
1944- President, Privy Council succeeding late Hara, Y oshimichi; succeeded as Vice President by
Shimizu, Toru.

7 Apr 1945- Premier, upon fall of Koiso Cabinet; concurrently Foreign Minister and GEA Minister. (Later
Shigenori became Foreign Minister.)
10 Apr 1945-Succeeded as President, Privy
Council, by Baron Hiranuma,
Kiichiro. Succeeded as GEA
Minister by Togo, Shigenori.
14 Apr 1945- To the amazement of the Japanese press, Suzuki expressed
profound sympathy for Americans in their loss of President
Roosevelt. He said: "I must
admit that Roosevelt's leadership has been ·very effective,
and has been responsible for
the Americans' advantageous
position today. For that reason
I can easily understand the
great loss his passing means
to the American people, and
my profound sympathy goes
to them." The ,Japanese press
remarked that these words give
evidence of Suzuki's calibre,
and show that he is sincerely
contributing to "achievement
of Japan's war aims and the
welfare of all nations."
23 Apr 194.')- For the first time since the assumption of his premiership,
Admiral Suzuki met in a conference with senior statesmen
including former premiers Baron
Kiichiro Hiranuma, AdmiralKeisuke Okada, Prince Kanoye,
Gen. Hideki Tojo, Koki Hirota,
and Gen. Kuniaki Koiso. The
occasion was for an exchange
of views of the current situation.
9 June 1945- The Tokyo radio reported that
Premier Suzuki opened an extraordinary 2-day session of the
Imperial Diet to consider the
"present national crisis."
11 June 1945- The Japanese radio reported that
the Lower Chamber of the
Japanese Diet passed the wartime emergency bill today with
slight amendments, giving Admiral Baron Suzuki, Japanese
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TAKAGI, Sokichi, Rear Admiral

Prime Minister, Virtual authority to rule Japan by Imperial
Decree.
29 July 1945- The Tokyo radio said that Premier Suzuki at a press conference declared that Japan
would ignore the Big Three
surrender ultimatum and continue unswervingly the prosecution of the war.

Career:

1893- Born, Kumamoto, Kyushu.
1915- Graduate, Naval Academy.
1928-Went to France to study.
1930- Assistant Adjutant and Chief Secretary to the Navy Minister.
1933- Instructor in Naval War College.
- Commander.
1936- Member, Naval General Affairs
Bureau, and research staff of
same.
1937- Chief of research section, Naval
General Affairs Bureau.
- Captain.
1939- Instructor of Naval Administration at the Naval War College.
1940- 0nce more Chief of research section of the Naval General Affairs Bureau; attached to the
Ministerial Secretariat.
1942- Chief of Staff, Maizuru Naval
Station.
1943- Attached to Naval General Headquarters.
- Rear admiral.
1944- Chief, Education Bureau, Navy
Ministry.
1944- Again attached to Navy General
Headquarters.
1945- Retired.

Personal Background:

Quiet, amiable, energetic, and clever. A good
administrator, very popular with subordinates.
An authority on strategy and torpedo tactics.
He has had duty in England and Germany;
speaks good English and a little German. Upon his
retirement in 1929, he became Grand Chamberlain and member of the Privy Council. In these
two posts he became advisor to the Emperor.
Later in 1929 he opposed the Tanaka Cabinet's
efforts to saddle the Commander in Chief of
the Kwantung Army with the entire responsibility
for the mysterious death of Marshal Chang
Tso-lin, the Manchurian war lord. Suzuki and
other advisors of the Emperor insisted that the
War Minster should also share the responsibility.
This issue was partly responsible for ihe fall of
of the Tanaka Cabinet. In 1930, Suzuki was
also responsible for securing the ratification of
the London Naval Treaty against the strong
opposition of the Naval General Staff, the Supreme War Council, and high military and naval
leaders generally." These acts in opposition to the
more militaristic policies of the armed services
earned Suzuki the hatred of the rising young
officer faction. In the military uprising of 26
February 1936, he was on the assassination list,
and was severely wounded by three revolver
shots.
In December 1936, upon his retirement as
Grand Chamberlain, he was given the title
"Baron." He continued to serve on the Privy
Council although he remained in virtual retirement. In June 1940, he was named Vice President
of the Privy Council and in 1944 became
President.
While Grand Chamberlain, Suzuki was a close
friend and colleague of such elder .statesmen as
Viscount Makino, Nobuaki, Lord Privy Seal,
and Prince Saionji, Kimmochi, Japan's most
distinguished liberal leader who attempted to
foster the growth of parliamentary government.

Jun

.M ar
Sep
15 Sep

TOGO, Shigenori

Caree1·:

Dec

1882- Born, Kagoshima prefecture.
1908- Graduate, Tokyo Imperial University.
1912- Entered Foreign Service.
1913- Served at Hankow, Mukden.
1916- Switzerland.
1918- Second Legation Secre.tary.
191 9- Germany.
1920- Second Embassy Secretary.
1921- 23-First Secretary, European and
American Bureau, Foreign
Office.
1925- First Secretary, Embassy m
Washington, D. C.
1929- Councillor, Embassy in Berlin.
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Dec.

1933- Director, European and American Bureau.
1934-Director, European and Asia
Bureau.
1937-Ambassador to Germany.
1938-40-Ambassador to Russia.
Apr-Aug 1945-Foreign Minister and GEA Minister, Suzuki cabinet.

by Gen. Juzo Nishio and Gen. Gen Sugiyama and
has enjoyed considerable support from the more
extremist patriotic societies.

TOYODA, Soemu, Admiral

Career:
1885--Born, Tokyo.
1905- Graduated Naval Academy.
1917- Lieutenant commander, Graduated Higher Naval College.
-Naval attache to Great Britain.
- ·Naval attache to Germany.
1921- Commander, executive officer of
CLKuma.
1923- Military Affairs Bureau, Naval
Training College.
1925- Captain, Naval General Staff; instructor, Higher Naval College.
1926-- Commanding officer, CL Yura.
1927- -Commanding officer of Seventh
Sub Division.
1928- Chief of first section, Training
Bureau; Staff of Special Inspector, appointed by the Emperor.
1930--- Commanding officer, BB Hyuga.
1 Dec 1931-Rear admiral.
1932-Staff of Special Inspector appointed J:-,y the Emperor.
1933- -Chief of Staff, Combined and
First Fleets.
1934-Director, Training Bureau.
1935- Director, Military Affairs Bureau.
15 Nov 1935- Vice Admiral.
1937-Commander in Chief, North China
Fleet, Fourth Fleet.
1938- Commander in Chief, Second
Fleet.
1939-· Director, Naval Technical Department.
1 Jan 1940-Board of Admirals; War Plans
Reviewing Dept, Imperial Headquarters.
18 Sep 1941-Admiral, Commander in Chief,
Kure Naval District.
10 Nov 1942-Supreme War Council. Relieved
as Commander in Chief, Kure,
by Vice Admiral Takahashi,
Ibo.

TOJO, Hideki, General

Career:
188419151919191919221934- 35-

Born, Tokyo.
Graduate, Military Staff College.
Aide-de-camp, War Office.
Resident officer, Germany.
Instructor, Military Staff College.
Chief, Mobilization Section.
Commanding Officer, First Infantry Regiment.
- Commanding, Officer, Twentyfourth Infantry Regiment.
1937- Chief, Police Affairs, Kwantung
Bureau.
-Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army.
May-Dec1938 -·- War Vice Minister.
Dec 1938 -·-Director-General, }.f ili tary A Yiation.
Sep · 1941- Relieved Shigenori Togo as Foreign Minister until appointment of Masayuki Tani.
18 Oct
1941-Appointed Premier, War Minister and Home Minister.
20 Apr 1943-Relieved Kunihiko Hashida as
Minister of Education until
Viscount Okabe was appointed
23 Apr.
8 Oct
1943- Took over post of Commerce and
Industry Minister.
21 Feb 1944-Chief of Army General Staff.
18 Jul
1944-Relieved as above by - General
Yoshijiro Umezu.
-- ·Resigned with entire Cabinet.
Also resigned as president of
IRAA.
11 Sep
1945- Attempted suicide.
9 Nov 1945- -Held at Omori Prison Camp
awaiting trial as war criminal.
29 Dec 1945-Entered Sugamo Prison.
Tojo typifies the Kwantung Army and the
Manchuria "continentalists.'' He has been backt;ld
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21 May 1943-Commander in Chief, Yokosuka
Naval District; Board of Admirals.
51-fay 1944- Commander in Chief, Combined
Fleet, succeeding Admiral Koga,
Mineichi, who had been killed
in action.
1 May 1945- Concurrently, Commander in Chief,
Over-all Naval Command; Commander in Chief , Grand Surface Escort, succeeding Admiral Nomura, Naokumi.
29 1[ay 1945- Chief, Naval General Staff, succeeding Admiral Oikawa, Rosiro.
8 Oct 1945- Requested by Baron Shidehara to
serve as Navy Minister; Toyoda
withheld consent pending sounding out of Allied opinion.
2 Dec 1945- 0rdered arrested as a war criminal.

Aug .

Personal Background:

1939- Commanding general, Kwantung
Army, Governor, Kwantung
leased territory, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo Government.
1 Aug 1940- General.
18 Jnl 1944 - Chief of General Staff Headquarters.
1944- Succeeded General Tojo as Chief
of Geneml Staff Headquarters.
1945- Supreme War Councillor.
--Honorary Advisor, Concordia Society, Manchuria.
2 Sept 1945- Signed surrender on board the U.
S. S. Missouri on behalf of the
armed forces . Later attended
rit~s reporting the end of the
war to the Imperial ancestors.
15 Oct 1945 ---Relieved of position as Chief of
the General Staff.

Able and forceful, extremely nationalistic and
anti-foreign. He is noted for his work as Commander in Chief of Tsingtao landing, and as leader
of Kwangchow-wan landing, 1937-38.

Alleged to be a member of the Black Dmgon
Society.
Like 'fojo, Umezu is a typical product of the
Kwantung Army.

YONAI, Mitsumasa, Admiral

UMEZU, Yoshijiro, General

Career:
1880190119131916-

Career:
Jan 1882- Born, Tokyo.
18 Mar 1904--Graduate, Military Academy.
1904- 1905-- Russo-Japanese War.
-Stud.ied in Germany.
- Military attache, Demnark.
Aug 1930- Major general.
1930- Commanding general, First Infantry Brigade, First Division, Tokyo.
Aug 1931--- Chief, General Affairs Department, General Staff Headquarters.
-Instructor, Military Staff College.
1934- Commanding general, North China
Garrison; author of Umezu-Ho
Yingchin agreement.
1935- -Comrn.anding general, Second Diviswn.
1936-- Vice-Minister of War in Hayashi and Terauchi war cabinets.
1938- Commanding general, First Army,
North China.

19171918192319231 Dec 1925192619271928-

1 Dec 1930193219331934-
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Born, Iwate prefecture.
Graduated, Naval Academy.
Graduated, Higher Naval College.
Commander. Attached to Embassy in Russia for study.
Sasebo Naval District.
N avy General Staff.
Commanding officer, OBB Kasuga;
commanding officer, BB Iwate .
Commanding officer, BB Mutsu.
Rear admiral.
Chief of Staff, Second Fleet.
Navy General Staff.
Commander in Chief, First Expeditionary Fleet
(Yangtze
River).
Vice admiral.
Commander in
Chief, Chinkai Guard District.
Commander in Chief, Third Fleet.
Commander in Chief, Sasebo
Naval District.
Commander in Chief, Second
Fleet.
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16 Aug 1945-Named Navy Minister in Higashikuni cabinet.
20 Nov 1945-Announced intention to retire following the abolition of theN avy
Ministry.
Background:
YONAI is believed to have been responsible for
making Hayashi dissolve the Cabinet on 31 May
1937. Grew, in "Ten Years in Japan," tellshow
Yonai assured Dooman on 19 April 1939 that
Japan would not join the Axis and would cooperate
with the Allies. Fleischer, in' 'Volcanic Isle," states
that a reactionary · plot attempted to assassinate
Y onai and Imperial Household Minister Tsuneo
Matsudaira, but was foiled by police with the
arrest of 38 members of the troops. Reactionaries
considered Yonai anti-Axis and against the New
Structure. Col. Kingoro Hashimoto was believed
to have been one leader behind the plot, but police
failed to arrest him. Yonai's cabinet fell when
War Minister Rata presented Army demands for
strengthening the Nation internally and reorienting foreign policy. Yonai refused and Rata
resigned as War Minister. The Army would not
name a successor and the Y onai cabinet fell.

1935-Commander in Chief, Y okosuka
Naval District. ·
1936- Commander in Chief, Combined
and First Fleets; Naval Training College.
1937- Navy Minister (In Hayashi, Konoye, and Hiranuma cabinets,
until 30 Aug 1939).
1937-Admiral.
1939- Supreme War Councilor (with
status as Cabinet Minister).
1940- Premier. Imperial councilor.
1944- Named, with General Koiso, Kuniaki, to form new Cabinet on
fall of Tojo.
1944- Vice Premier, and concurrently
Navy Minister, in the new
Koiso cabinet. Restored to
active service for tenure of office
as Navy Minister.
1945- Navy Minister in new Suzuki
cabinet.
1945- Adviser to Sensai Engo Kai (War
R elief Association).
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